Cooperation with the future in an OLG framework

How to cite

Lohse, Johannes; Hauser, Oliver; Groff, Zach Freitas; Grodeck, Ben. 2022. "Cooperation with the future in an OLG framework." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009928. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9928-1.0

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Johannes Lohse* , Oliver Hauser , Zach Freitas Groff , Ben Grodeck

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009928
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9928-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-08-15 – 2022-09-15
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9928

Abstract

People living today often have little-to-no incentive to contribute to multi-generational public goods that (primarily) benefit later generations. Prior experimental tests of this proposition have used different versions of the intergenerational goods game to show that many members of today’s generation indeed follow the Nash prediction of zero contributions. Yet, these existing frameworks and experiments abstract from some important features of intergenerational goods (IGG) problems. This paper adds a critical feature where multiple generations can overlap. With overlapping generations, there is a richer strategy space that may make cooperation with future generations sustainable, even among purely self-interested agents. In this project, we aim to study theoretically and experimentally the mechanisms behind why people do (and do not) contribute to intergenerational public goods. Across several experimental conditions, we consider and test mechanisms such as the role of social information, reciprocity, fear of retaliation, and efficiency concerns that can affect the decision to give to the past, present or future – or not give at all.

Intervention

We conduct an online experiment using a modified form of the IGG. In this experiment, participants are randomized to a sequence of decision-makers of indefinite lengths (with a continuation probability of 80% after every round). Depending on the treatment, each participant can make allocation choices that affect the experimental earnings of themselves, of other members in his/her sequence and/or of members of a different sequence. Depending on the treatment, participants have knowledge about the prior choices of participants in their sequence/a different sequence.

We test two main categories of interventions and how they affect participants’ contributions to future generations. All interventions are fully discussed in the hidden section.

Experimental design

All aspects of the design and procedures are discussed in the hidden section of the pre-registration

Design details

Randomization method
Subjects are randomized to treatments via a computer program embedded in the experimental software. Within each treatment, subjects will also be randomly allocated to a specific sequence within the treatment. In each treatment, we have 50 sequences. We will pre-determine the lengths of each sequence (number of participants before the sequence ends, as there is a 20% chance the sequence stops after each participant) by randomly generating 50 sequence lengths using a random number generator (see below).
Randomization unit
Randomisation will occur at the individual level: once entering the study, participants will be randomized to a treatment and sequence within treatment.
Clusters
We plan to have 50 sequences in each treatment. This will result in 50*8=400 sequences.
Observations
Within each sequence, there is a 20% chance that the sequence stops after each participant. Thus, in expectation, the average sequence will consist of 5 participants. In the actual implementation of our random number generator, we arrived at a realized average sequence length of 4.7 with the following lengths. (Sequence length/number of sequences) 1/9 2/8 3/4 4/7 5/6 6/7 7/2 9/2 12/2 13/1 14/1 15/1 This means that we will recruit 235 participants to each of our eight treatment conditions for a total of 1880 individuals. Additionally, we recruit 350 participants to the seed sequences and further participants that take the role of recipients for starting players in the respective conditions (but will not make active decisions in the experiment).
Arms
In each treatment, there will be 50 sequences, with 235 participants according to the randomly predetermined list of sequences shown above.
Primary outcomes
1) Allocations to Account C (“FIG” – i.e. the amount given to future generations) 2) Whether participants allocate anything positive amount (>0) to Account C (FIG) 3) For BIG-FIG arms, the percentage of pairs of consecutive participants in a sequence, with slack budgets (i.e. how many pairs choose inefficient strategies). We define as an inefficient strategy the possibility within a pair of consecutive participants in a sequence if money from the respective private accounts (Account A in the experiment) could be redistributed to accounts C and B of the respective players without making either player in the pair worse off financially. 4) For BIG-FIG arms, comparing the average and median of each of the following across all pairs of consecutive players: The maximum amount the first player could be made better off by a Pareto improvement assuming risk neutrality. The maximum amount the second player could be made better off by a Pareto improvement assuming risk neutrality. 5) The average payoff per player in a sequence relative to (i) the maximally attainable average amount (ii) the maximally attainable amount sustainable as a (Nash) equilibrium of the game We plan to test the effects of choice sets, information received, and which generation receives the allocations, on these five primary outcomes, by comparing across treatments.
Secondary outcomes
To understand the different mechanisms underlying the treatment effects, we will also test (in those treatments where sufficient information is available and the respective accounts are part of the choice set): 1) FIG allocations, conditional on the FIG allocations in the past generation(s) 2) FIG allocations, conditional on BIG allocations in the past generation 3) Unconditional levels of BIG contributions and whether any positive amount (>0) is allocated to the BIG account 4) BIG allocations, conditional on FIG allocations in the past generation 5) BIG allocations, conditional on BIG allocations in the past generation 6) Versions of primary outcome #4 that account for different levels of risk aversion. We will use the EG task we employ in the questionnaire to (i) classify participants into risk-neutral, risk averse and risk seeking and (ii) to understand the strength of risk averse preferences

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Keywords