Strategic bidding in multi-object auctions
How to cite
Finster, Simon. 2022. "Strategic bidding in multi-object auctions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009924. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9924-1.12
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
I study strategic bidding behaviour in three pay-as-bid multi-object auctions: a Product-Mix auction, a sequential auction, and a simultaneous auction. In a theoretical model, bidders are assumed to behave optimally, i.e. are maximising their expected surplus. This model predicts that, in equilibrium, the Product-Mix and the sequential format perform nearly identically with respect to bidder surplus, revenue, and welfare. The simultaneous auction, however, performs slightly worse than the other two formats. I test if these predictions hold up in a virtual lab experiment. I consider a bidding environment identical to the theoretical model of an asymmetric market, but also study a bidding environment with symmetric bidders, a more general setting for which current Bayes-Nash equilibrium models cannot make predictions.
Intervention
Each subject is participates in several bidding rounds of a multi-object auction. Some subjects compete against computerised bidders and some subjects compete against other participants. All subjects also answer a survey on demographics, bidding experience, and complete additional tasks relating to numeracy and risk/ambiguity preferences.
Experimental design
Each auction mechanism in a given environment corresponds to one treatment. I run a between-subject design, in which each subject is randomly assigned to one of six treatments: (Product-Mix auction, sequential auction, simultaneous auction) x (computerised opponents, human opponents). In the computerised environment, each subject competes against two computerised bidders for two virtual objects with induced values. The distribution of the computerised bidders' bids is known. In the human environment, subjects compete in groups of three for two virtual objects with induced values. The distribution of the human opponents' induced values is known to all subjects within the same group. In each treatment, subjects play a number of bidding rounds. The outcome of each round is shown to the subject at the end of each round and payments are disclosed at the end of the experiment.
Design details
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