Misperceived abilities and gender stereotypes within the household

How to cite

Nani, Carlotta. 2022. "Misperceived abilities and gender stereotypes within the household." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009909. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9909-1.0

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Carlotta Nani*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009909
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9909-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2022-06-26 – 2023-10-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9909

Abstract

Over the past twenty years, the gender gap in Bangladesh has substantially shrunk. Nevertheless, Bangladeshi women constitute the majority of the unbanked population, they maintain a low level of agency within the household and are excluded from income-generating activities. Stereotypes that depict women as unfit to work or to manage resources can reinforce social norms and make rules of the law or policies ineffective. If individuals form opinions through gender stereotypes that present women as not capable, then correcting these misbeliefs could reduce gender discrimination and improve women’s agency.
I conduct an experiment across 42 rural villages in Bangladesh and I study women’s low agency as a result of imperfect information. Specifically, I investigate (i) whether women are discriminated against because they are deemed unskilled; (ii) whether women have a low willingness to be more involved because they believe the stereotypes; (iii) whether updating beliefs alleviates stereotypes and improves women’s agency.
I test these hypotheses with an innovative incentivized decision-making game played by married couples: during the game, I update individuals' beliefs about women's abilities and I observe whether and how decisions change.

Experimental design

The lab experiment consists of an incentivized decision-making game played by married couples. During the game, spouses play simultaneously but separately: they answer simple questions and earn money for each correct answer. Final earnings depend on both spouses’ performance. The main feature of the game is that some questions are worth more, and some are worth less. Players decide privately how many high and low-payoff questions they and their spouses will answer. Couples are randomly assigned to an information arm and a control arm. After the first round, couples in the information arm receive a belief update about women’s skills. The control arm receives no update. I measure whether and how, following the information provision, players’ decisions change.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Couples
Clusters
500 couples
Observations
1000 individuals
Arms
250 treated couples 250 control couples
Primary outcomes
Number of high-payoff questions assigned by the husbands to their wives. Number of high-payoff questions assigned by the wives to themselves.

Cited by

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Keywords