Unstructured Bargaining with Costly Money Holdings
How to cite
Klapp, Francisco. 2022. "Unstructured Bargaining with Costly Money Holdings." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009875. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9875-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This project expands the already existing large experimental literature exploring various theories of non-cooperative bargaining behavior, contributes to the emerging laboratory evidence on monetary policy inner workings and, more generally, to the growing idea that laboratory tests of monetary policy can be a part of the analyst's toolkit alongside theory and empirical field data.
In order to achieve the above-mentioned goals, I deviate from a typical bargaining experiment in the following ways:
1. Most bargaining experiments involve a fixed pie to divide and an explicit extensive form for the bargaining process. In this paper I study bargaining solutions in a setting where the pie size is determined endogenously and simultaneously with the division of the pie, and the bargaining has very little structures (what I will call semi-unstructured bargaining).
2. To the best of my knowledge, so far no bargaining experiment has considered the possibility of endogenous liquidity constraints, implemented trough ex-ante choice of costly money holdings. In fact, Duffy et al. (2021), on which this works builds on, are the first to introduce the possibility of a liquidity constraint in a bargaining experiment but they do that by imposing the constraint as an exogenous factor.
Intervention
Interest rates faced by buyers to borrow money before meeting with potential sellers.
Experimental design
The natural experimental implementation is to allow participants, who are assigned as either buyers or sellers, to bargain in a (semi) unstructured fashion over the price and quantity to be produced and trade given different interest rates. This will allow to infer which of the bargaining protocols is more relevant in this particular context.
I implement a within subject treatment for different interest rates, with fixed roles trough-out each sessions and random matching in each round. My goal is to run 12 sessions with 10 players per session, each with 2 practice rounds and 30 paying rounds.
In terms of the actual interface, I use Otree with the following sequence: First, buyers select how much to borrow at a certain interest rate, then they are randomly matched (using a random number generator) with a seller and bargain over quantity and price by making as many offers as they want with restrictions only on time, non-withdrawal of proposals and avoiding negative surpluses. Bargaining stops after 120 seconds or when one of the player's accepts an offer.
Design details
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