Unstructured Bargaining with Costly Money Holdings

How to cite

Klapp, Francisco. 2022. "Unstructured Bargaining with Costly Money Holdings." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009875. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9875-1.0

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Francisco Klapp*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009875
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9875-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-08-02 – 2022-09-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C78, C92, D83
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9875

Abstract

This project expands the already existing large experimental literature exploring various theories of non-cooperative bargaining behavior, contributes to the emerging laboratory evidence on monetary policy inner workings and, more generally, to the growing idea that laboratory tests of monetary policy can be a part of the analyst's toolkit alongside theory and empirical field data.

In order to achieve the above-mentioned goals, I deviate from a typical bargaining experiment in the following ways:
1. Most bargaining experiments involve a fixed pie to divide and an explicit extensive form for the bargaining process. In this paper I study bargaining solutions in a setting where the pie size is determined endogenously and simultaneously with the division of the pie, and the bargaining has very little structures (what I will call semi-unstructured bargaining).

2. To the best of my knowledge, so far no bargaining experiment has considered the possibility of endogenous liquidity constraints, implemented trough ex-ante choice of costly money holdings. In fact, Duffy et al. (2021), on which this works builds on, are the first to introduce the possibility of a liquidity constraint in a bargaining experiment but they do that by imposing the constraint as an exogenous factor.

Intervention

Interest rates faced by buyers to borrow money before meeting with potential sellers.

Experimental design

The natural experimental implementation is to allow participants, who are assigned as either buyers or sellers, to bargain in a (semi) unstructured fashion over the price and quantity to be produced and trade given different interest rates. This will allow to infer which of the bargaining protocols is more relevant in this particular context.

I implement a within subject treatment for different interest rates, with fixed roles trough-out each sessions and random matching in each round. My goal is to run 12 sessions with 10 players per session, each with 2 practice rounds and 30 paying rounds.

In terms of the actual interface, I use Otree with the following sequence: First, buyers select how much to borrow at a certain interest rate, then they are randomly matched (using a random number generator) with a seller and bargain over quantity and price by making as many offers as they want with restrictions only on time, non-withdrawal of proposals and avoiding negative surpluses. Bargaining stops after 120 seconds or when one of the player's accepts an offer.

Design details

Randomization method
Recruitment of volunteers using SONA software: Students enroll in one of the offered dates using our website and they are paired with 9 other students who decided to enroll in the same date. If more than 10 volunteers enroll for a single date we randomly select (using a random number generator) which students will participate. Those who are not selected to participate can enroll again for an upcoming session.
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
120 UCI students
Observations
120 UCI student with 30 rounds each
Arms
120 UCI student with 30 rounds each
Primary outcomes
The main outcomes I'm interested in are the money holdings buyers bring to the bargaining stage, output traded and price. I'll be recording and time-stamping all of the offers so I can track the entire bargaining process.

Cited by

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Keywords