Preferences for Redistribution and Social Mobility: The Role of Motivated Beliefs.
How to cite
Vollert, Gabriel; Kurschilgen, Michael. 2022. "Preferences for Redistribution and Social Mobility: The Role of Motivated Beliefs.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009833. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9833-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
People who believe to live in a society with high social mobility generally prefer significantly less redistribution. However, people hold highly inaccurate beliefs about the amount of social mobility. A plausible reason why these beliefs are so inaccurate is that people do not only form beliefs with the intention to maximize accuracy, but rather they might also hold motivated beliefs. With our study we aim to understand (i) whether people hold motivated beliefs with regards to social mobility and, if they do, (ii) which kinds of motivated beliefs are most important in influencing their redistribution preferences.
We study two types of motivated beliefs about social mobility that relate to preferences for redistribution. For one, people might be overconfident with respect to the degree of upward mobility that they will experience, which leads them to prefer less redistribution. Apart from that, people may hold a specific redistribution preference in the first place and then form their beliefs about social mobility in order to justify their redistribution preferences.
We test for (i) the existence of overconfidence and/or "justifying beliefs" with regards to social mobility as well as (ii) their relative importance for the redistribution preferences in an online experiment on Prolific.
In the control group, subjects perform an effort task and indicate their belief about their rank in the effort task. A subject’s payoff is either determined by her rank in the effort task or by sheer luck. We tell subjects about their payoff, but not whether it was their effort or luck that determined this payoff. We then ask subjects about how likely they think it is that their payoff was determined by effort rather than luck. After that, subjects get to vote on the amount of a redistributional tax which comes at an efficiency cost. In the control group, neither overconfidence nor justifying beliefs matter for the preferences for redistribution by design.
In our overconfidence treatment, we allow overconfidence to affect the redistribution preferences by not telling subjects about their payoff before the vote for their preferred tax rates, thereby giving overconfident subjects room to state a lower preferred tax rate compared to the absence of overconfidence. In our justifying beliefs treatment, subjects are aware of the subsequent tax voting when they are asked about their beliefs regarding the role of effort vs luck. Thus, they can potentially report higher (lower) beliefs about the importance of effort in determining payoffs in order to justify a low (high) redistribution preference.
We compare differences in beliefs and preferred tax rates across treatments in order to assess whether or not motivated beliefs about social mobility exist in our setting at all and, if they do, in order to assess their impact on preferences for redistribution.
Intervention
We study two types of motivated beliefs about social mobility that relate to preferences for redistribution. For one, people might be overconfident with respect to the degree of upward mobility that they will experience, which leads them to prefer less redistribution. Apart from that, people may hold a specific redistribution preference in the first place and then form their beliefs about social mobility in order to justify their redistribution preferences. We test for (i) the existence of overconfidence and/or "justifying beliefs" with regards to social mobility as well as (ii) their relative importance for the redistribution preferences in an online experiment on Prolific.
In our experiment, subjects perform an effort task and receive a payoff which may or may not depend on their performance in the effort task. We interpret the degree to which subjects can actually influence their own payoff via effort provision as the amount of social mobility in our setting. After the effort task subjects enter a redistribution stage, where they vote on a preferred redistributive tax to determine the final payoffs for everyone. In our control treatment we ask subjects without them knowing of the redistribution stage about their belief that effort rather than luck was deterministic for their pre-tax payoff payments. In our justifying beliefs treatment we ask subjects the same question, but inform them about the existence of a redistribution stage prior to the question. With this information they can potentially form their beliefs in order to justify their preferred redistribution demand. Our overconfidence treatment is also similar to our control treatment, the difference here being that we do not inform subjects about their pre-tax payoff in the overconfidence treatment. Thus, overconfidence matters for the decision on the preferred tax rate in our overconfidence treatment, but not in our control treatment, since subjects already know their own payoffs in the control treatment. Across all our treatments we additionally vary the probability with which effort rather than luck determines payoffs. We do this in order to gain an understanding of how motivated beliefs are formed under different levels of social mobility.
Experimental design
At the start of our experiment subjects perform an effort task, more specifically the slider task of Gill and Prowse (2012). We ask subjects to indicate their belief regarding their own performance in the effort task relative to others. Afterwards, subjects receive a payoff which is either determined on the basis of their performance in the effort task or determined by sheer luck. Whether a subject's payoff is determined by effort or luck is random: With a specific probability p, effort is deterministic for the payoff. We vary this probability p across all our treatments using three different values for p, which are 0.8, 0.5 and 0.2. After subjects have learnt their payoff, we ask them to state how likely it is that their payoff was determined by effort rather than luck. Finally, subjects vote upon a redistributive tax with efficiency losses, which influences their own and other subjects' payoffs. We also record subjects' risk preferences and other demographic variables in a questionnaire after the experiment.
The above mentioned design is exactly the design in our control group.
In our justifying beliefs treatment we tell subjects about the existence of a redistribution stage before they indicate their beliefs regarding whether it was effort or luck which determined their pre-tax payoffs. Thus, subjects can possibly alter their belief report in order to justify a specific redistribution preference, a behavior which is impossible in our control treatment due to the unawareness of a redistribution stage being played later.
In our overconfidence treatment we also stick to the above mentioned design of the control group, except for the fact that we do not tell subjects about their pre-tax payoffs. Thus, overconfidence can potentially affect their preferred tax rates.
Design details
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