State Paralysis: The Effect of Compliance Uncertainty on Government Effectiveness

How to cite

Martinez, Socorro Pardo; Moreira, Diana; Naritomi, Joana; Fernandes, Gustavo; Faleiros, Daniel; Pereira, Blenda. 2022. "State Paralysis: The Effect of Compliance Uncertainty on Government Effectiveness." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009821. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9821-4.0

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Socorro Pardo Martinez* , Diana Moreira , Joana Naritomi , Gustavo Fernandes , Daniel Faleiros , Blenda Pereira

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009821
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9821-4.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2022-07-12 – 2025-06-18
Countries
Brazil ()
JEL codes
D73, H41, I18, K42
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9821

Abstract

Regulation and enforcement around the use of public funds can reduce corruption, but does it also alter incentives to spend? In this paper, we investigate whether compliance uncertainty around spending rules can stifle valuable-to-the-public spending and distort policy choice. We leverage administrative data and a collaboration with the Brazilian Council of Municipal Health Secretaries (CONASEMS, which organizes large conferences with municipal health heads responsible for managing, on average, a USD 1 million health budget. We first present three descriptive facts of the context consistent with the importance of compliance uncertainty for aggregate public spending. First, 20% of municipalities have experienced substantial incomplete spending for more than 10 years. Second, around one-fourth of the mayors are convicted with large penalties, even when there is no incidence of corruption. Lastly, regulation complexity is associated with incomplete spending (in the administrative data and a policymakers' perception in a survey). We then establish the causal link between compliance uncertainty and the spending decision, in a low-stakes lab-in-the-field experiment at CONASEMS conferences. We offer management support to implement a valuable public policy, namely a children's kit to reward parents who complete the vaccination scheme. We vary whether the children's kit includes "toys’’ (vs. "hygiene’’) items to be purchased with health earmarked funds. Preliminary evidence from the pilot shows that the toys policy bundle is perceived to be equally effective, but has a 20% reduced willingness to pay. Consistent with a risk-effectiveness trade-off, the toys policy bundle is perceived to have a higher risk.

Intervention

We study the causal effect of compliance uncertainty on spending decisions in a lab-in-the-field experiment with municipal health heads, in partnership with the Brazilian Council of Municipal Health Secretaries (CONASEMS). We offer policymakers management support to implement a valuable public policy, namely a children's kit to reward parents who complete the vaccination scheme. Crucially, we introduce exogenous variation in the compliance uncertainty associated with the public policy while holding constant its perceived effectiveness. We vary whether the children's kit includes "toys’’ (vs. "hygiene’’) items to be purchased with health earmarked funds. With this random variation, we will be able to understand whether compliance uncertainty around the regulation of public funds alters incentives to spend and distorts policy choice.
The experiment will be implemented in collaboration with CONASEMS, the Brazilian Council of Municipal Health Secretaries. CONASEMS organizes a variety of conferences throughout the year, in which all Brazilian municipal health heads participate. We will administer it during the 2025 National Congress of CONASEMS in June 2025.

Experimental design

The survey experiment will first describe one of the main challenges that municipalities are dealing with in the health sector. We will present health officials with a valuable incentive public policy that aims to overcome this challenge. This initiative will be presented along with a proposal for management support to facilitate its implementation. We will use the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) method to elicit participants’ demand for the proposed management support.
Our experiment introduces exogenous variation in the compliance uncertainty associated with budget execution by randomizing the components of the incentive policy. Specifically, the treatment version includes non-health sector items to be procured with funds earmarked for health. This variation will let us test whether compliance uncertainty around the regulation of public funds alters incentives to spend and distorts policy choice.
We also examine whether increasing the salience of the prosecution risk makes policymakers react more to compliance uncertainty. To do so, we randomize information about prosecution risk using data from the Federal Audit Court (TCU).
Finally, we assess how much policymakers value a proposal that helps reduce this uncertainty. To this end, we randomize the content of the management support proposal, with some participants receiving a version that includes additional risk-reduction components.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done on the spot by Qualtrics.
Randomization unit
Individual
Observations
700 individuals
Arms
We do with three independent randomizations: Randomization A: Compliance Uncertainty Treatment A (High compliance uncertainty): 50% Control A (Low compliance uncertainty): 50% Randomization B: Salience of Prosecution Risk Treatment B (Increased salience): 50% Control B (No salience): 50% Randomization C: Management Support with Risk-Reduction Components Treatment C (With risk-reduction components): 30% Control C (Without risk-reduction components): 70%
Primary outcomes
​​Our outcome variable will be participants’ demand for the proposed management support. Following a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure, we will elicit participants’ maximum willingness to pay to receive this support. This will inform us about the local health heads’ demand for compliance guarantees.
Partners
Name: CONASEMS Partner_type: government Url: https://www.conasems.org.br/

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Keywords