Why do consumers ignore hidden costs?

How to cite

Bengali, Leila; Bhanot, Syon. 2022. "Why do consumers ignore hidden costs?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009817. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9817-1.0

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Leila Bengali* , Syon Bhanot

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009817
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9817-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2022-07-21 – 2022-07-31
Countries
United States of America ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9817

Abstract

Prior research has documented that consumers act as if they ignore hidden costs (such as sales tax). The goal of our research is to understand why this is the case, by explicitly testing several hypotheses. In prior work, we have tested whether inattention is likely attributable to lack of knowledge, lack of accurate information, or forgetfulness. These hypotheses are not supported by the data. We also tested whether constraints on cognitive resources, slack budget constraints, how prices and costs are presented affect attention.

Intervention

In the current study, our goal is to test two hypotheses: 1) whether the pursuit of transaction utility could lead individuals to disregard hidden costs; and 2) whether present bias or numerical literacy affects an individual’s tendency to disregard hidden costs.

Experimental design

In the current study, our goal is to test two hypotheses: 1) whether the pursuit of transaction utility could lead individuals to disregard hidden costs; and 2) whether present bias or numerical literacy affects an individual’s tendency to disregard hidden costs.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done by a computer
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
n/a
Observations
500
Arms
250
Primary outcomes
Intended analysis Does deal utility exist in the context of transactions with hidden costs? (i.e. do people get more utility from transactions in which sales taxes are not shown compared to transactions in which sales taxes are shown?) We will compare the subjective ‘deal’ rating responses by treatment group. These ratings were designed to be a direct subjective measure of transaction utility. As a secondary analysis, we will compare the probability of choosing to buy the product between those randomly assigned to see prices with sales taxes (tax-inclusive treatment arm) and those randomly assigned to see prices without (tax-exclusive treatment arm). If seeing prices without sales tax increases transaction utility, we would expect this to result in an increased probability that the participant will choose to buy the product. In both cases, we will make simple comparisons of proportions (or means) as well as testing the hypotheses using regressions that control for the amount of transaction utility (as defined in prior theoretical work as the difference between the expected price and the actual price), demographic characteristics, and other factors that have been shown to affect attention such as a change in the left-most digit once sales taxes are included. Do measures of present bias or numeracy affect transaction utility when prices are shown with or without sales tax? We will use regression analyses to test whether any difference between transaction utility (using the subjective ‘deal’ questions and also the decision to buy the products) in the tax-exclusive and tax-inclusive treatment arms varies systematically by numeracy and/or present bias. Do people make choices to preserve transaction utility? We will compare the subjective ratings and the probability of purchasing the products between respondents who saw prices as they indicated that they would prefer to see prices and those who saw prices the other way. That is, we will see whether seeing prices in the preferred way results in more transaction utility from a given purchase decision. How do individuals prefer to see prices and taxes? We will test whether participants’ preference for how to see prices (tax-inclusive, tax-exclusive, all-in) and their level of support for an all-in price policy varies by treatment arm, numeracy score, or presence of present bias (using the simple definition of choosing $100 now and $110 in eight days). We will run these analyses as simple comparisons of means and in regressions with controls as noted above.

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Keywords