Corporate Financial Reporting: Experimental Evidence and Economic Implications

How to cite

Rostam-Afschar, Davud; Liu, Yuhan; Bischof, Jannis. 2022. "Corporate Financial Reporting: Experimental Evidence and Economic Implications." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009794. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9794-1.0

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Davud Rostam-Afschar* , Yuhan Liu , Jannis Bischof

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009794
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9794-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-08-01 – 2024-03-15
Countries
Private
JEL codes
G30, G32, M14, M41, D91, C83
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9794

Abstract

In this project, we study whether firms manage their earnings and the key drivers that influence the probability of firms conducting earnings management. Companies take various measures to achieve their earnings targets. Financial reporting regulations give firm decision makers (some) flexibility in the way they present information allowing them to manipulate figures deliberately and actively according to their own objectives. The prevalence of earnings management, however, is difficult to quantify since archival data is silent on the decision-making process. Survey methods may overcome this problem. However, given the sensitive nature of earnings management, issues such as measurement error (non-response, recall bias, social desirability bias) may arise. To elicit truthful answers to sensitive questions, we run a double list experiment (Droitcour et al., 1991) and compare the estimates of the proportion of firms that engage in earnings management to those from direct and indirect questioning.

Intervention

Our experiment consists of two baseline lists (with/without sensitive item included), a direct question about own engagement in earnings management, and an indirect question about earnings management regarding other companies. Survey participants are randomly assigned to different groups that contain different sets of questions. In the list experiment, the respondent is only asked to provide a total number of activities that the firm engaged in from the listed activities, not which ones.

Experimental design

Survey participants are randomly assigned to four different groups that receive different sets of questions. In the list experiment, the respondent is only asked to provide the total number of the listed items they have engaged in in the past, not which ones. The averaged value of the two mean-difference estimators is an estimation for the proportion of respondents who have managed earnings.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by a computer through Qualtrics
Randomization unit
Firm
Clusters
No clusters
Observations
Approx. 1,800 questionnaires with valid responses by firm representatives
Arms
Each treatment arm has 450 observations of firm representatives
Primary outcomes
• proportions of earnings management determined by the total number of items respondents provided from the list experiment • economic implications (management actions, investments, hiring)
Secondary outcomes
• time frequency of conducting earnings management from the direct question • time frequency of conducting earnings management from the indirect question

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords