The role of payoff parameters for cooperation in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma

How to cite

Gaechter, Simon; Lee, Kyeongtae; Sefton, Martin; Weber, Till O.. 2022. "The role of payoff parameters for cooperation in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009784. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9784-1.0

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Simon Gaechter* , Kyeongtae Lee , Martin Sefton , Till O. Weber

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009784
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9784-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-08-02 – 2022-08-16
Countries
Private
JEL codes
A13, C91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9784

Abstract

This study investigates the effect of variation in material payoffs on cooperation in experimental one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games. Following Mengel (2018) we vary three payoff indices. Indices of risk and temptation capture the unilateral incentives to defect against defectors and co-operators respectively, while an index of efficiency captures the gains from cooperation. In a previous analysis, we found that risk has no effect on cooperation, temptation reduces cooperation, and efficiency increases cooperation. Here we provide a confirmatory analysis of these results using a between-subjects design that varies payoff parameters in an orthogonal way and where participants will play one one-shot game.

Experimental design

Pairs of participants play one one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We have a between-subjects design with 8 prisoner's dilemma games. We vary the PD’s payoff matrix across the eight games as shown below:

G1: T=600; R=500; P=200; S=90
G2: T=600; R=500; P=200; S=20
G3: T=800; R=500; P=200; S=90
G4: T=800; R=500; P=200; S=20
G5: T=600; R=500; P=400; S=180
G6: T=600; R=500; P=400; S=40
G7: T=800; R=500; P=400; S=180
G8: T=800; R=500; P=400; S=40

Notes: S=Temptation payoff; R=Reward payoff, P=Punishment payoff, S=Sucker payoff. Payoffs in experimental currency.

Participants will be randomly matched into pairs and to one of the eight games.

Participants will be asked to complete two tasks: (1) Choose whether to cooperate or defect in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and (2) indicate the likelihood that the other person will choose to cooperate. The choices will be neutrally labeled as A and B. The order of tasks and choices will be randomised.

After taking part in the prisoner’s dilemma game, participants will be asked to complete a socio-economic background questionnaire.

The experiment will be run on Amazon Mechanical Turk with 200 participants in each of the 8 games, that is, with a total of 1,600 participants. The experiment is programmed with the software LIONESS Lab (https://lioness-lab.org/).

Design details

Randomization method
The software will randomly allocate participants at the pair-level.
Randomization unit
Individuals will be randomly matched into pairs and to one of the eight one-shot prisoner's dilemma games.
Clusters
200 participants for each of the 8 games
Observations
1,600 participants
Arms
200 for each of the 8 games
Primary outcomes
The decisions to cooperate or defect in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game
Secondary outcomes
Beliefs about others' cooperation or defection decision in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords