Understanding Peer Pressure in Education

How to cite

Bursztyn, Leonardo; Jensen, Robert; Egorov, Georgy. 2015. "Understanding Peer Pressure in Education." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000975. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.975-1.0

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Leonardo Bursztyn* , Robert Jensen , Georgy Egorov

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0000975
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.975-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2015-12-08 – 2016-04-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/975

Abstract

In this project, we combine theory with field experiments to identify the relative importance of different mechanisms underlying peer pressure in education in different school settings.

Experimental design

Based on a simple model, we hypothesize that when both schooling effort and output are potentially observable to peers, students may lower their educational investment to avoid social penalties, according to two different mechanisms. We show theoretically that if students are concerned about appearing "smart" in front of their peers, or if students care about appearing "cool"/social, the result might be a lower level of schooling effort when compared to a situation where these concerns do not exist.

We designed a simple field experiment, in the spirit of the one used by Bursztyn and Jensen (2015) to identify the importance of these two mechanisms. We plan to visit high schools in the LA area, targeting 11th grade classrooms. Students will be offered the chance to sign up for a lottery to access a free online SAT prep package. We will randomly vary at the student level:

1) whether students believe their decision to sign up and the score of an individual diagnostic test score will be observed by their classmates;
2) the probability (25% vs 75%) that students gain access to the package conditional on signing up for the lottery.

Our hypotheses are:

1) "public" sign up rates should be lower than "private" sign up rates;
2) changes in the probability of winning of lottery should have a small or null effect on the "private" sign up rates;
3) changes in the probability of winning of lottery are expected to have an effect on the "public" sign up rates:
a) in settings where trying to appear cool/social is the predominant mechanism, a higher probability should lead to a higher sign up rate;
b) in settings where trying to appear smart is the predominant mechanism, a higher probability should lead to a lower increase in the sign up rate and potentially even a negative effect on the sign up rate.

We will visit schools where we expect different mechanisms to be dominant:
1) schools in low-income areas: we expect "signaling that one is cool" to be the dominant mechanism;
2) schools in middle or higher income areas: we expect ""signaling that one is smart" to be the dominant mechanism.

Design details

Randomization method
The differing sign up forms will be shuffled and distributed to students in the order they sit in the room.
Randomization unit
Students, within classrooms
Clusters
Approximately 16-18 classrooms (the exact number will depend on agreements with each school).
Observations
500 (approximate, since classroom sizes will vary)
Arms
About 60-65 observations for each one of the four treatments in "signaling that one is cool" schools, and about 60-65 observations per treatment arm in "signaling that one is smart" schools (sample sizes are approximate, since classroom sizes will vary).
Primary outcomes
Our key outcome variable of interest is the student's decision to sign up for the SAT prep package lottery. It is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the student signs up and zero otherwise.

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Keywords