Experimental Investigation of “Raffle” mechanism

How to cite

Khubulashvili, Robizon; Linardi, Sera; Immorlica, Nicole; Lucier, Brendan; Mollner, Joshua; Weyl, Glen. 2022. "Experimental Investigation of “Raffle” mechanism." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009742. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9742-1.0

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Robizon Khubulashvili* , Sera Linardi , Nicole Immorlica , Brendan Lucier , Joshua Mollner , Glen Weyl

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009742
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9742-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-07-25 – 2022-08-31
Countries
United States of America ()
JEL codes
C78; C92; D82
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9742

Abstract

In this project, we study the relative performance of the "raffle" mechanism compared to standard resource allocation mechanisms used today. Paper by Immorlica, Lucier, Mollner, and Weyl (20017) proposes a practical and straightforward ``raffle” mechanism for allocating a limited supply of heterogeneous goods among consumers. They show theoretically that the raffle mechanism could outperform ordinal algorithms in terms of efficiency because consumers can signal not only their ordinal but cardinal utilities as well. To test this hypothesis among human subjects, we designed an experiment.

Intervention

Please find the attached document for the details in the Analysis Plan section.

Experimental design

The experiment is in three parts. In both treatments, the first part is the main game. The second and third parts are respectively risk elicitation (Holt and Laury (2002)) and the k-level reasoning elicitation game (Arad and Rubinstein (2012)). Below we describe the main game for each treatment.

In both treatments, subjects first read the textual instructions where the respective allocation algorithm is explained. To improve their understanding of the algorithms we designed the two videos, where the algorithm is explained with animations. After reading the instructions and watching the video, subjects need to complete 4 quiz questions. They are allowed to advance to the school choice game only if they answer all 4 questions correctly. They have two tries after which they are disqualified from the study and restricted to participate in the same study again.

Subjects who complete the comprehension quiz successfully play 6 rounds of matching games. In each round, subjects are randomly selected in groups of three. Each subject receives information about their own and two other subjects' preferences. What changes from round to round is preference structure. After each round subjects receive no feedback, instead we ask them to explain their reasoning.

Please see the attached document for more details.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done on an online platform - prolific.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
2 treatments
Observations
204 subjects
Arms
Treatment 1: 34 groups, treatment 2: 34 groups. Each group has 3 subjects.
Primary outcomes
The main variable that we use to compare the performance of a mechanism is efficiency.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords