Legislative Bargaining with Private Information
How to cite
Vanberg, Christoph; Piazolo, David. 2022. "Legislative Bargaining with Private Information." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009732. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9732-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We conduct a three person legislative bargaining experiment in the lab. The main treatment variable is the decision rule (unanimity vs. majority rule). The game involves a probability of "breakdown" following failure of a proposal. In case of breakdown, players receive exogenously fixed breakdown values. These breakdown values are private information in some of the experimental periods. Our main hypothesis is that subjects are more likely to vote "no" (on comparable proposals) and to claim (via free form messages) that they have a high breakdown value under unanimity rule than under majority rule, resulting in lower agreement rates.
Intervention
See abstract
Experimental design
The game involves a fixed proposer and two responders. The proposer has two chances to make a proposal, with a probability of breakdown following failure the first proposal and certain breakdown following failure of the second. Breakdown values are randomly assigned (high or low) independently in each round. The continuation probability is varied between sessions. Subjects play 10 Rounds of complete and 10 rounds of private information regarding the breakdown values (order varied between sessions). When voting on the first proposal, voters can optionally send a message that is displayed to all participants together with voting results.
Design details
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