Procedural fairness and externalities under uncertainty

How to cite

Weber, Nina. 2022. "Procedural fairness and externalities under uncertainty." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009701. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9701-1.1

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Nina Weber*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009701
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9701-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2022-07-07 – 2022-07-17
Countries
United States of America ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9701

Abstract

Many decisions people make have the potential to create positive externalities. This is especially the case for decisions that are made under uncertainty: Starting a business, developing new technologies, or investing into new ventures, are all decisions that involve uncertainty about personal gains and losses, but have potential positive externalities for wider society. For example, a successful entrepreneur may create jobs, knowledge spillovers, or improve welfare through her products and services. The likelihood of a person choosing such entrepreneurial activities is however affected by whether and how societies reward this decision. One channel that may affect such rewards are individuals’ distributive preferences. If individuals hold a preference to reward risk takers who create positive externalities for society, then this creates demand for policies in line with such preferences. How potential externalities affect distributive preferences is however an open question. In this study, I will provide a theoretical framework and a first experimental test of how potential externalities affect distributive preferences when income is earned under uncertainty.

Experimental design

My basic experimental design follows in particular Cappelen et al. (2013) by asking an impartial spectator to decide on a fair allocation of a monetary bonus between two decision makers. Prior to spectators making their distributive choice, decision makers have to choose between a lottery and a safe income. In the treatment condition, choosing the lottery does not just yield a potentially high reward for the decision maker if successful, but might also result in positive externalities for the participant pool.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done automatically by the software.
Randomization unit
Individual-level randomization into treatment and control groups.
Clusters
n/a
Observations
A total of 3600 spectator decisions across one control and two treatment groups
Arms
360 decision makers and 180 spectators
Primary outcomes
Spectator allocation decision

Cited by

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Keywords