Identity as an excuse: opportunistic identity management in labor markets

How to cite

Chabanova, Evgeniya; Hett, Florian; Bauer, Kevin. 2022. "Identity as an excuse: opportunistic identity management in labor markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009693. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9693-1.0

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Evgeniya Chabanova* , Florian Hett , Kevin Bauer

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009693
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9693-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-12-23 – 2023-01-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9693

Abstract

A large body of evidence shows that group identity fosters cooperation, coordination, and trust. However, little is known about exploitation of group identity to justify self-serving behavior. We use a novel laboratory experiment to study whether, and if so to what extent, people make strategic group identity choices to behave opportunistically in the context of labor markets. At the beginning, in an effort choice setting, participants work in groups for two distinct firms, creating two potential group identities. Subsequently, participants in the role of a principals make wage offers to participants in the role of agents for a newly founded firm. As our treatment, we vary the disclosure of agents’ employment history to the principal, i.e., their previously shared group memberships. We conjecture that participants strategically search for or avoid additional information about agents’ employment histories to find dissimilarities. Finding dissimilarities allows principals to identify strategically with the non-shared group to justify outgroup wage discrimination.

Experimental design

We test 3 mechanisms for opportunistic identity management and, hence, run three experiments:
1) avoiding the situation where identity matters altogether (experiment 1);
2) strategic belief formation about others’ identity (processing exogenous information; experiment 2);
3) strategic information avoidance or seeking for strategic belief formation (demand for information; experiment 3).

Each experiment comprises three consecutive stages. In stage 1, participants gain job experience: they are randomly assigned to work sequentially at two different firms. The two firms are the two groups which constitute the participant’s social identity throughout the experiment. In stage 2, participants move to a new firm in the role of principal and hire a professional (another participant) to work for them in this new firm. At the hiring stage the principal observes CVs of several candidates and decide upon their wages. One of the candidates is then randomly selected to work together with the principal. In stage 3, participants work together in the newly established firms.
Wages offers for the candidates in stage 2 are realized as dictator game in which dictator (i.e., the principal) sets wages for all offered candidates and one of the candidates is randomly selected to be hired. Candidates vary in their previously gain job experience.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done by a computer.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
150-240 individuals per treatment arm, i.e., ~1000 participants in total
Observations
150-240 individuals per treatment arm, i.e., ~1000 participants in total
Arms
Experiment 1: approx. 150 individuals in the control arm and approx. 150 individuals in the treatment arm Experiment 2: approx. 180 individuals in the control arm and approx. 180 individuals in the treatment arm Experiment 3: approx. 240 individuals in the control arm and approx. 240 individuals in the treatment arm
Primary outcomes
Allocations in dictator game, willingness-to-pay (WTP), elicited beliefs, information acquisition

Cited by

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Keywords