The Cost of State Officials' Manager's Demand for Bribes
How to cite
sierra, Raul sanchez de la; Titeca, Kristof; Nkuku, Albert Malukisa; Lameke, Aimable A.; Haoyang. 2022. "The Cost of State Officials' Manager's Demand for Bribes." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009691. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9691-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We analyze the organization of corruption in a state agency. The dual mandate of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's traffic police agency is to manage traffic and to enforce the traffic code. We first document that, in the capital's branch, Kinshasa, traffic fines account for only 22% of the revenue generated by the branch. The remaining 78% of revenue comes from bribes paid by drivers. 63% of revenue from bribes is generated through a "quota scheme:'' managers at police stations ask agents posted at street intersections to escort drivers to the stations, where the managers extract a bribe from the drivers themselves. Experimentally decreasing the quota level, hence mitigating its effect, we find that the quota scheme worsens the agency's ability to fulfill its first mandate, while not improving its ability to fulfill the second. First, the quota causes 65% of all traffic jams and almost all accidents at the branch's intersections. Second, we find evidence suggesting that it fuels allegations against drivers that are more often false-extortion-than true, consistent with the scheme not creating incentives to comply with the code. The findings emphasize that the manager's demand for bribes is significant and creates profits and distortions beyond those that would be made possible via corruption by individual state officials.
Intervention
We provided a randomized encouragement to the police station managers to reduce the quotas of some intersections in some days in the battalion.
This generates random variation in the manager's demand for bribes through its main instrument, the quota.
In reducing the quota, we can compare public service under current system of corruption vs. with agent corruption alone. We use this experiment to analyze the social cost of manager organized corruption.
Experimental design
The design leverages that each manager commands multiple teams of agents, and deploys each of his teams permanently to a specific intersection. While agents have some freedom to move between intersections during the day, re-deployment of agents across intersections is rare. The normal channel through which managers communicate the quota to the corresponding teams is a routine phone call placed by the commander to the team leader each morning. In the experimental sample, the mean quota is 6.5 among the untreated team-days. While teams' quotas vary day by day, the typical quota level of each team is well-known (henceforth, natural quota).
Design details
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