Prosocial signaling with a history
How to cite
Fries, Tilman. 2022. "Prosocial signaling with a history." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009689. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9689-2.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
Social media and internet search engines give easy access to information about others. This paper studies the behavioral consequences when individuals know more about others they interact with. In principle, increased knowledge limits the ability of decision makers to signal their type through their actions. Thus, if decision makers want to signal a socially desired type, increased knowledge in turn decreases the supply of socially desired behavior. There are however factors that might lead to "unlearning", such as a belief that people can change or that yesterday's news might be forgotten which can keep reputational incentives strong even as individuals learn more about each other's past. I test the behavioral effect of increased knowledge in an experiment and investigate which factors lead to unlearning.
Intervention
The experiment varies what an observer knows about a decision maker (DM) who is about to make a moral decision. Further interventions vary whether the observer's knowledge about the DM refers to a recent or a past decision of the DM and whether the observer receives information about the DM just before the DM decides or two weeks earlier.
Experimental design
Participants first state what share of a budget they want to allocate to a charity A. They then decide what share of a budget they want to allocate to a charity B. In the third task, participants play a modified sender-receiver game where the receiver has to estimate sender's donation share to charity B. The sender can send information to the receiver before the receiver makes the estimate. Incentives between sender and receiver are misaligned.
In the Baseline treatment, participants give answers to all three stages of the experiment on the same day (in one session). In addition, the receiver receives a signal about the sender's charity A decision before reporting an estimate in the sender-receiver game.
In Treatment A receivers do not receive a signal about the sender's charity A decision before reporting an estimate.
Treatment B introduces a two week time delay between the donation to charity A and the donation to charity B and the trust game. That is, there are two sessions: In session 1, participants only make the donation choice to charity A. In session 2, participants make the donation choice to charity B and participate in the sender-receiver game. Session 2 takes place two weeks after session 1.
Treatment C introduces a two week delay between the donation to charity B and the sender-receiver game. That is, there are two sessions: in session 1, participants make the donation choices to charities A and B. In session 2, participants take part in the sender-receiver game. Session 2 takes place two weeks after session 1.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.