Incentives and payment mechanisms in preference elicitation
How to cite
Drichoutis, Andreas; Palma, Marco. 2022. "Incentives and payment mechanisms in preference elicitation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009687. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9687-5.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Experiment 1: This study is composed of two parts.
In part 1 we study the effect of incentives and payment mechanisms in preference elicitation. We vary incentives at five levels (hypothetical vs. 0.2% chance of subject getting paid vs. 1% chance of subject getting paid vs. 50% chance of subject getting paid vs. 100% chance of subject getting paid) and payment mechanism at five levels (pay one randomly/POR vs. pay all correlated with one draw at the end for all decisions/PAC vs. PAC divided by number of decisions vs. pay all at the end with independent draws for each decision/PAI vs. PAI divided by number of decisions). Incentives and payment mechanisms are varied between subjects. We use an induced value BDM mechanism to elicit preferences that varies within subjects the Induced Value ($1 and $3) with which subjects are endowed and the support of the price distribution ($4, $5 and $6) from which random prices are drawn. Subjects receive a $2.5 show up fee plus their earnings from part 1.
In part 2 of this study we elicit preferences for a conventional and a Criollo steak. We endow subjects with the conventional steak and ask them to bid to exchange the conventional steak with a Criollo steak. We elicit preferences for the Criollo steak with the BDM mechanism and vary between subjects the support of the distribution from which random prices are drawn ($4 and $5). Subjects are assigned to one of the following treatments: a) hypothetical treatment b) real treatment c) a treatment where subjects are told they have a 10% chance of actually having their decision realized d) a treatment where subjects are told that 50 out of 500 subjects will have their decision realized e) a treatment where subjects are told they have a 1% chance of having their decision realized. For subjects that have their decisions realized, we will ship steaks to their address via 2-day ground coolers dry ice via UPS/Fedex. Only those subjects that have their decisions realized, are endowed with $5.
For a subsample of subjects (500), we also test whether submitting a bid with a slider or a box makes a difference. We added two tasks similar to Part 1. Subjects bid in an induced value BDM ($2) with a support that varies at two levels ($3, $4). One of the two tasks is randomly drawn for payment. Subjects are randomized either to a treatment with sliders or a treatment where they use a box to submit their bid.
Experiment 2: This study is a follow up to Experiment 1 where we elicit preferences in an induced value second price auction and follow a 2x2 design: (hypothetical incentives vs. 100% chance of subjects getting paid) x (PACn vs. POR payment mechanism). Subjects participate in four bidding rounds where they bid to sell a card that varies the induced value across rounds: $1, $1.7, $2.4 and $3.
Experiment 3: This study follows the lottery choice design in Cox et al. (2015) Paradoxes and mechanisms for choice under risk. Experimental Economics, 18:215–250, where we adopt a 3x2 between subjects design involving the payment mechanisms (using the Cox et al. notation) and realization of incentives: (PORnp vs. PAC/N vs. PAI/N) x (Hypothetical incentives vs. Real incentives).
Intervention
Experiment 1: This study is composed of two parts.
In part 1 subjects are randomized on a between-subjects basis in one of the treatments of a 3x5 design. We vary incentives at three levels (1% chance of subject getting paid vs. 50% chance of subject getting paid vs. 100% chance of subject getting paid) and payment mechanism at five levels (pay one randomly/POR vs. pay all correlated with one draw at the end for all decisions/PAC vs. PAC divided by number of decisions vs. pay all at the end with independent draws for each decision/PAI vs. PAI divided by number of decisions). We use an induced value BDM mechanism to elicit preferences that varies within subjects the Induced Value ($1 and $3) with which subjects are endowed and the support of the price distribution ($4, $5 and $6) from which random prices are drawn. Subjects receive a $2.5 show up fee plus their earnings from part 1.
In part 2 of this study we elicit preferences for a conventional and a Criollo steak. We endow subjects with 5$ and the conventional steak and ask them to bid to exchange the conventional steak with a Criollo steak. We elicit preferences for the Criollo steak with the BDM mechanism and vary between subjects the support of the distribution from which random prices are drawn ($4 and $5). Subjects are assigned to one of the following treatments: a) hypothetical treatment b) real treatment c) a treatment where subjects are told they have a 10% chance of actually having their decision realized d) a treatment where subjects are told that 50 out of 500 subjects will have their decision realized. For subjects that have their decisions realized, we will ship steaks to their address via 2-day ground coolers dry ice via UPS/Fedex. Only those subjects that have their decisions realized, are endowed with $5.
After data collection for the above design was completed, we added a treatment for Part 1 for incentives and subjects were given a 0.2% (1 in 500 chance) of having their decisions realized and payment mechanism was varied between subjects at five levels (pay one randomly/POR vs. pay all correlated with one draw at the end for all decisions/PAC vs. PAC divided by number of decisions vs. pay all at the end with independent draws for each decision/PAI vs. PAI divided by number of decisions).
We also added one treatment in Part 2 where subjects had a 1% chance of having their decisions being realized.
For this additional treatments, we added a Part 3 in order to test whether submitting a bid with a slider or a box makes a difference. To this regard, we added two tasks similar to Part 1. Subjects bid in an induced value BDM ($2) with a support that varies at two levels ($3, $4). One of the two tasks is randomly drawn for payment. Subjects are randomized either to a treatment with sliders or a treatment where they use a box to submit their bid.
After collecting data for these additional treatments we added a hypothetical treatment for Part 1.
Experiment 2: This study is a follow up to Experiment 1 where we elicit preferences in an induced value second price auction and follow a 2x2 design: (hypothetical incentives vs. 100% chance of subjects getting paid) x (PACn vs. POR payment mechanism). Subjects participate in four bidding rounds in groups of four subjects, where they bid to sell a card that varies the induced value across rounds: $1, $1.7, $2.4 and $3. In each round, subjects are induced with a different value so that aggregate valuation remains constant across rounds.
Experiment 3: This study follows the lottery choice design in Cox et al. (2015) Paradoxes and mechanisms for choice under risk. Experimental Economics, 18:215–250, where we adopt a 3x2 between subjects design involving the payment mechanisms (using the Cox et al. notation) and realization of incentives: (PORnp vs. PAC/N vs. PAI/N) x (Hypothetical incentives vs. Real incentives).
Experimental design
Experiment 1: This study is composed of two parts.
In part 1 subjects are randomized on a between-subjects basis in one of the treatments of a 3x5 design. We vary incentives at three levels (1% of subjects gets paid vs. 50% of subjects vs. 100% of subjects) and payment mechanism at five levels (pay one randomly/POR vs. pay all correlated with one draw at the end for all decisions/PAC vs. PAC divided by number of decisions vs. pay all at the end with independent draws for each decision/PAI vs. PAI divided by number of decisions). We use an induced value BDM mechanism to elicit preferences that varies within subjects the Induced Value ($1 and $3) with which subjects are endowed and the support of the price distribution ($4, $5 and $6) from which random prices are drawn. Subjects receive a $2.5 show up fee plus their earnings from part 1.
In part 2 of this study we elicit preferences for a conventional and a Criollo steak. We endow subjects with 5$ and the conventional steak and ask them to bid to exchange the conventional steak with a Criollo steak. We elicit preferences for the Criollo steak with the BDM mechanism and vary between subjects the support of the distribution from which random prices are drawn ($4 and $5). Subjects are assigned to one of the following treatments: a) hypothetical treatment b) real treatment c) a treatment where subjects are told they have a 10% chance of actually having their decision realized d) a treatment where subjects are told that 50 out of 500 subjects will have their decision realized. For subjects that have their decisions realized, we will ship steaks to their address via 2-day ground coolers dry ice via UPS/Fedex. Only those subjects that have their decisions realized, are endowed with $5.
After data collection for the above design was completed, we added a treatment for Part 1 for incentives and subjects were given a 0.2% (1 in 500 chance) of having their decisions realized and payment mechanism was varied between subjects at five levels (pay one randomly/POR vs. pay all correlated with one draw at the end for all decisions/PAC vs. PAC divided by number of decisions vs. pay all at the end with independent draws for each decision/PAI vs. PAI divided by number of decisions).
We also added one treatment in Part 2 where subjects had a 1% chance of having their decisions being realized.
For this additional treatments, we added a Part 3 in order to test whether submitting a bid with a slider or a box makes a difference. To this regard, we added two tasks similar to Part 1. Subjects bid in an induced value BDM ($2) with a support that varies at two levels ($3, $4). One of the two tasks is randomly drawn for payment. Subjects are randomized either to a treatment with sliders or a treatment where they use a box to submit their bid.
After collecting data for these additional treatments we added a hypothetical treatment for Part 1.
Experiment 2: This study is a follow up to Experiment 1 where we elicit preferences in an induced value second price auction and follow a 2x2 design: (hypothetical incentives vs. 100% chance of subjects getting paid) x (PACn vs. POR payment mechanism). Subjects participate in four bidding rounds in groups of four subjects, where they bid to sell a card that varies the induced value across rounds: $1, $1.7, $2.4 and $3. In each round, subjects are induced with a different value so that aggregate valuation remains constant across rounds.
Experiment 3: This study follows the lottery choice design in Cox et al. (2015) Paradoxes and mechanisms for choice under risk. Experimental Economics, 18:215–250, where we adopt a 3x2 between subjects design involving the payment mechanisms (using the Cox et al. notation) and realization of incentives: (PORnp vs. PAC/N vs. PAI/N) x (Hypothetical incentives vs. Real incentives).
Design details
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