A Market-Equilibrium Approach to Reduce the Incidence of Vote-Buying
How to cite
Marx, Benjamin; Blattman, Christopher; Larreguy, Horacio; Reid, Otis. 2016. "A Market-Equilibrium Approach to Reduce the Incidence of Vote-Buying." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000965. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.965-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Vote-buying remains a major impediment to democracy in low-income countries. We propose to evaluate a campaign against vote-buying ahead of the 2016 election in Uganda. Our experiment will be a randomized saturation design varying the fraction of villages treated at the constituency level. This design will allow us to provide the first estimates of the spillover and local general equilibrium effects of a campaign of this kind and recover estimates for how anti-vote buying campaigns affect not only the incidence of vote buying, but also politician and party behavior.
Intervention
We intend to study the impacts of a large anti-vote buying campaign conducted across 53 districts in Uganda in January and February 2016. The campaign was designed and implemented by a coalition of 17 local civil society organizations, the Alliance for Election Campaign Finance Monitoring (ACFIM), and coordinated and funded by an international NGO, the National Democratic Institute (NDI). Their approach seeks to foster collective commitments in a village not to sell any votes.
The intervention took place during the two months leading up to the election, and involved several stages in each selected village:
1. Each household received a leaflet approved by the Electoral Commission explaining in simple terms the costs and risks of vote-buying to the community.
2. Three community-wide meetings were organized to discuss the vote-buying issue, facilitated by a local ACFIM activist.
3. At the end of the third meeting, ACFIM activists invited the community to collectively commit to refuse offers of gifts or money in exchange for votes.
4. ACFIM activists then placed posters through the village indicating the village is a "no vote-buying village."
5. Prior to the presidential and MP election (February 18, 2016), individuals that attended the village meetings received automatized phone calls (robo-calls) recorded by prominent religious figures reminding them to abide by the collective guidelines agreed upon in community meetings.
Experimental design
Our experimental sample includes 2,796 villages across 53 Ugandan districts, 110 parliamentary constituencies, and 918 parishes. Among these, 1,427 villages across 611 parishes were selected for treatment. The remaining 307 parishes were allocated a pure control group with no village treated. An additional 1,399 villages located in the same 918 parishes were added to the endline survey sample to look for spillovers (we oversampled villages in parishes with a higher treatment saturation).
The intervention uses a randomized saturation design, along the lines of Baird et al. (2014), varying the level of saturation of treatment at the parish level. (Parishes are the geographic unit just above village and generally consist of 3-10 villages.) Based on our qualitative work, we understand that most vote-buying is organized at this level. We have allocated parishes to one of three cells: a pure control cell (no treatment), a partial-saturation treatment cell (50% of eligible villages are treated), and a high-saturation cell (100% of eligible villages are treated). On average, across all parishes with at least one eligible village, 40% of registered voters in a parish live in eligible villages.
This design will allow us to recover the spillover effect on the non-treated and the total (general equilibrium) causal effect of the intervention, in addition to standard intent-to-treat estimates, as well as how those estimates vary with treatment intensity. We believe that the treatment effect could be quite different if more nearby villages are treated, since the more villages resist vote-buying, the more political candidates will be forced to change tactics by making policy promises instead. If only one village opposes vote-buying, we believe that candidates may instead simply buy more votes in nearby villages, showing the importance of a widespread campaign in order to discipline candidate behavior.
Design details
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