Effort and Morals in Markets
How to cite
Lange, Andreas; Schmitz, Christian. 2022. "Effort and Morals in Markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009626. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9626-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Understanding moral behavior in different market contexts and the effect of such behavior on giving. We consider the dynamics of moral decision making. Individuals may change their moral stands over a sequence of choices. Specifically, they have a choice between two technologies when conducting a real-effort task, with one giving a higher personal return, but a smaller social payoff (reduces a donation pool). Following the real effort task, subjects can donate under varying information and competition conditions. We are interested in learning to what extent these conditions affect (i) the initial choice of the technology, and (ii) the subsequent donation decisions.
We add to the literature on mora behavior in markets. We provide a more realistic experimental environment that is inspired by charitable giving, e.g. via foundations, that often follows market activities that generate private incomes (fortunes), but may have had negative externalities. By varying the observability of individual actions as well as by varying the competitiveness in the initial money-earning stage, we are able to identify the underlying motivational mechanisms that govern moral/immoral behavior.
Intervention
This experiment will be conducted as an online experiment of the experimental laboratory of the University of Hamburg. The experiment will combine a real-effort task and a subsequent donation option. Two technologies are available: one give a larger personal payoffs than the other but leads to a deduction from a charity pool. We conduct a baseline and 2x3 treatments (EXO_A: exogenous technology A; EXO_B: exogenous technology B. T1: endogenous choice of technology; T2: endogenous choice of technology with observer, info only on final donation; T3: endogenous choice of technology with observer, info on technology choice and final donation. T4-T6 repeat T1-T3, but introduce a competitive element in which two participants are matched and a bonus payment is made to the one with the highest personal earnings in the real-effort task.
In the observer treatments, an observer is grading 6 participants. Participants know that they will receive feedback at the end of the experiment on their own grade and the average grade given to the 5 other participants.
Experimental design
This experiment will be conducted as an online experiment of the experimental laboratory of the University of Hamburg. The experiment will combine a real-effort task and a subsequent donation option. Two technologies are available: one give a larger personal payoffs than the other but leads to a deduction from a charity pool. We conduct a baseline and 2x3 treatments (EXO_A: exogenous technology A; EXO_B: exogenous technology B. T1: endogenous choice of technology; T2: endogenous choice of technology with observer, info only on final donation; T3: endogenous choice of technology with observer, info on technology choice and final donation. T4-T6 repeat T1-T3, but introduce a competitive element in which two participants are matched and a bonus payment is made to the one with the highest personal earnings in the real-effort task.
In the observer treatments, an observer is grading 6 participants. Participants know that they will receive feedback at the end of the experiment on their own grade and the average grade given to the 5 other participants.
Design details
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