Probability Biases in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

How to cite

Yeganloo, Atiyeh. 2022. "Probability Biases in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009613. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9613-1.1

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Atiyeh Yeganloo*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009613
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9613-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-02-03 – 2019-02-17
Countries
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Manchester)
JEL codes
C71, C91, D01, G41
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9613

Abstract

This study provides evidence that biases attributed to the perception of probabilities affect cooperation levels in repeated games. In an experiment, subjects completed a prisoner’s dilemma game that continued to the next round with a fixed probability. Under the standard assumption of (constant) discounted expected utility, such a probability can be interpreted as time discounting. The presence of probability biases leads to deviations from constant discounting, as shown in Halevy (2008, AER), which then affects the evaluation of the outcomes in the game and, the hypothesis is that this affects the cooperate-defect decision of subjects. Using an incentive-compatible mechanism based on scoring rules, we quantify the direction and magnitude of subjects’ probability bias. We find that 53% of subjects are expected utility (EU) subjects; 21% of subjects reveal biases that accord with prospect theory: small probabilities are overweighted and medium to large ones are underweighted (inverse-S); 26% of subjects underestimate small probabilities and overestimate large probabilities (S-shape). The main finding is that the cooperation level is correlated with the type of biases. Specifically, for all continuation probabilities, inverse-S subjects cooperate more than EU subjects, and S-shape subjects cooperate less than EU subjects. We explain this behaviour in repeated games by adopting Halevy’s impatience index.

Intervention

The experiment consists of two parts, a game experiment and a elicitation experiment. In the game experiment, I test cooperation levels in repeated PD games. The hypothesis is that biases in the treatment of probabilities may affect cooperation levels. The controls for the type of bias will be extracted from the elicitation experiment on individual choice, where I implement a procedure based on scoring rules. I present the design of games and individual choice part next.

Experimental design

The experiment consists of two parts, a game experiment and a elicitation experiment. In the game experiment, I test cooperation levels in repeated PD games. The hypothesis is that biases in the treatment of probabilities may affect cooperation levels. The controls for the type of bias will be extracted from the elicitation experiment on individual choice, where I implement a procedure based on scoring rules. I present the design of games and individual choice part next.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
104 university students
Observations
104 university students
Arms
Treatment 1 (36 students). Treatment 2 (32 students). Treatment 3 (36 students).
Primary outcomes
Cooperation, and probability biases. Subjects’ probability biases predict their cooperation in the first round for low and moderate continuation probabilities.

Cited by

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Keywords