Employer Preferences and Information Asymmetry in Campus Recruiting Labor Markets
How to cite
Erda, Tarikua; Caron, Laura. 2022. "Employer Preferences and Information Asymmetry in Campus Recruiting Labor Markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009574. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9574-7.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Undergraduate recruitment is a key channel for many firms to recruit workers for entry level jobs. However, the preferences of employers over job applicant characteristics have not been granularly studied. Moreover, little is known about students' perception about employer preferences, even though information asymmetries among job seekers may to contribute to disparities in labor market outcomes. This study aims to address these gaps in the literature using surveys and experiments on both employers and students participating in campus recruiting programs. Particularly, an Incentivized Resume Rating exercise (following Kessler, Low, Sullivan, 2019) will be conducted by employers to understand their preferences and their hiring heuristics. Job seeking students will also perform a similar exercise and also report their beliefs about employer preferences, which will help to expand our understanding of information asymmetries between the labor demand and supply sides, as well as the heterogeneity in the degree to which different types of job seekers understand employer preferences accurately.
Intervention
Resume-level randomized intervention
Following Kessler, Low, Sullivan (2019), the incentivized rating exercise will present employers with various hypothetical resumes in which the GPA, work experience, activities, and characteristics of the hypothetical student presented in the resume are randomly selected and combined into a single hypothetical resume.
Experimental design
As part of the Incentivized Resume Rating exercise, each employer respondent will review and rate hypothetical resumes on three different metrics: hiring interest, perceived probability of the candidate accepting an offer, and the wage the employer would offer to the candidate based on this information alone. Students will also complete this exercise as part of our study on information asymmetries.
Design details
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