The Impact of Intra-household Information Asymmetry on Labor Supply
How to cite
ZHOU, ALEX; Mahadeshwar, Ruchi. 2022. "The Impact of Intra-household Information Asymmetry on Labor Supply." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009564. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9564-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
While existing literature suggests that removing information asymmetry between spouses leads to more efficient household economic decisions (Ashraf, 2009; Castilla & Walker, 2013), it is unknown whether the overall impact of revealing income information to one's spouse is positive because social pressure to redistribute one's income distorts labor supply decisions (Carranza et al., 2021). Using a randomized control trial with Cambodian garment workers, we will study the effect of removing income information asymmetry between spouses on overall household expenditures through two channels: (1) labor supply and (2) intra-household reallocation.
Intervention
The proposed study will be a lab-in-the-field experiment with low-income individuals whose income-making efforts are closely tied to their productivity, Cambodian garment workers. Our main intervention will vary the extent to which the participants are aware of their spouses' earnings in the lab sessions.
If the sample size allows, we may also cross-randomize a second intervention. The second intervention will vary the difference between spouses' earnings and effort in the lab sessions.
Experimental design
The research team will recruit around 300 couples from Cambodian textile factories. After recruitment, participants will be randomly assigned to participate in one lab session described below.
Control Group Intervention Session: Couples are separated upon arrival and told that the women are in one room and the men in another. At the beginning of the experiment, the participants are told about the task they will be asked to complete and how earnings for the task are calculated. Male participants are also explicitly told at the beginning of the session that their earnings would be kept private from their spouses.
During the experiment, male participants will be asked to work on simple production tasks (assembling/dissembling clothing tags). The male participants will earn a basic reward for attending the session. In addition, they will earn a small unit price for every piece they make.
Female participants will be asked to sit in a small workshop and listen to a short presentation from our partner NGO. They will not work on production tasks. They will earn a basic reward for attending the session.
Treatment Group 1 Intervention Session: Treatment session 1 follows the same procedure as the control session, except that the male participants will now be explicitly told at the beginning of the session that their wives will be informed of their earnings at the end. After the experiment, the female participants will receive information on their husbands' earnings.
Treatment Group 2 Intervention Session: Couples are separated upon arrival and told that the women are in one room and the men in another. At the beginning of the experiment, the participants are told about the task they will be asked to complete and how earnings for the task are calculated. Female participants are also explicitly told at the beginning of the session that their earnings would be kept private from their spouses.
During the experiment, female participants will be asked to work on simple production tasks (assembling/dissembling clothing tags). The female participants will earn a basic reward for attending the session. In addition, they will earn a small unit price for every piece they make.
Male participants will be asked to sit in a small workshop and listen to a short presentation from our partner NGO. They will not work on production tasks. They will earn a basic reward for attending the session.
Treatment Group 3 Intervention Session: Treatment session 3 follows the same procedure as treatment session 2, except that the female participants will now be explicitly told at the beginning of the session that their husbands will be informed of their earnings at the end of the session. After the experiment, the male participants will receive information on their wives' earnings.
At the end of the session, the research team will ask each participant to state his/her preference for allocating the session's earnings between himself/herself and his/her spouse. The participant will receive the portion of income that he/she prefers to keep private. Then, the participants will be reunited with their spouses. The couples will be given a short period to decide how to allocate the session's earnings. Finally, after a couple reaches a final decision, they will report the decision to the research team, and the research team will distribute the remaining earnings according to their decision.
If the sample size allows, we may also cross-randomize a second intervention. The second intervention will vary the difference between spouses' earnings and effort in the lab sessions. During the experiment, the husbands will be asked to conduct a simple production task. The husbands will work under a piece-rate wage system. The wives will:
Group 1: earn a low fixed wage for attending an information session (no effort).
Group 2: earn a low fixed wage for performing a simple production task (effort).
Group 3: earn a high fixed wage for attending an information session (no effort).
Group 4: earn a high fixed wage for performing a simple production task (effort).
Design details
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