Performance Incentives to Local Politicians in South India

How to cite

Shrestha, Slesh. 2022. "Performance Incentives to Local Politicians in South India." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009543. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9543-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Slesh Shrestha*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009543
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9543-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2013-01-01 – 2022-08-01
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9543

Abstract

Despite growing awareness of various failures of electoral democracy, there is a relative lack of evidence on effective policy interventions to improve the performance of elected officials and motivate them to act more equitably. We conducted an experiment where we randomly assigned elected presidents of village governments in Tamil Nadu, India to one of two incentive schemes (or a control group); a financial incentive that rewards better-performing presidents with a higher public budget, and a non-financial incentive which awards them a certificate demonstrating their achievement with an information campaign to disseminate it. We measure the effectiveness of these incentives on their overall performance in the delivery of public goods and private transfer schemes, as well as the equity effects on the targeting of these programs within their village.

Experimental design

Recently elected Gram Panchayat presidents were assigned to one of two performance-based incentive schemes with a public reward (or to a control group). A financial incentive rewards better-performing presidents with a higher public budget, and a non-financial incentive awards them a certificate demonstrating their achievement with an information campaign to disseminate it.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization was done in the office by a computer
Randomization unit
Gram Panchayat (GP)
Clusters
198 GPs
Observations
198 GPs
Arms
64 control GPs, 67 financial incentive GPs, 67 nonfinancial incentive GPs
Primary outcomes
- Overall performance of GP Presidents based on PVP project evaluation criteria - Improved access to main private transfer schemes available in the GP president at the time of the evaluation (based on PVP project evluation data) - Improved targetting of key public infrastructure programs within the GP (based on PVP project evaluation data)

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords