Performance Incentives to Local Politicians in South India
How to cite
Shrestha, Slesh. 2022. "Performance Incentives to Local Politicians in South India." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009543. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9543-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Despite growing awareness of various failures of electoral democracy, there is a relative lack of evidence on effective policy interventions to improve the performance of elected officials and motivate them to act more equitably. We conducted an experiment where we randomly assigned elected presidents of village governments in Tamil Nadu, India to one of two incentive schemes (or a control group); a financial incentive that rewards better-performing presidents with a higher public budget, and a non-financial incentive which awards them a certificate demonstrating their achievement with an information campaign to disseminate it. We measure the effectiveness of these incentives on their overall performance in the delivery of public goods and private transfer schemes, as well as the equity effects on the targeting of these programs within their village.
Experimental design
Recently elected Gram Panchayat presidents were assigned to one of two performance-based incentive schemes with a public reward (or to a control group). A financial incentive rewards better-performing presidents with a higher public budget, and a non-financial incentive awards them a certificate demonstrating their achievement with an information campaign to disseminate it.
Design details
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