"Prosocial behavior: a tale of two images"

How to cite

HENRY, EMERIC; Galbiati, Roberto; Jacquemet, Nicolas. 2022. ""Prosocial behavior: a tale of two images"." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009449. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9449-1.0

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EMERIC HENRY* , Roberto Galbiati , Nicolas Jacquemet

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009449
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9449-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2022-04-28 – 2022-05-27
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9449

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to study the linkages between self and social image. Our framework introduces two new elements. First, players can either (i) strategically choose the criterion based on which they will judge their own actions or (ii) decide to ignore all moral dimensions and pay for blindness. Second, and most importantly, we link self-image to social-image by imposing a coherence principle between the way self-image is calculated and the way other people’s actions are judged: individuals use the same criterion to judge themselves and others. The benefit of this coherence motive can be microfounded by the cost documented in the literature in social psychology of being perceived as a hypocrite, as well as the willingness of people to avoid cognitive dissonance induced by behaving inconsistently. We test the predictions of our model in the context of a dictator game experiment with passive observers. The main treatment is a game in which observers are themselves active and need to take the action they judge before sending their evaluation of the behaviour of the dictators. The change in observers’ evaluations allows to test the coherence principle, while the change in dictator’s behavior provides empirical evidence on whether such a change in social image is internalized.

Intervention

We have 5 treatments
T1 donation without observers
T2 donation with passive observers
T3 donation with active observers
O1 passive observers
O2 active observers

Experimental design

Recruitment and Pool of participants
The experiment will be run online. We will use the services of Foule Factory, a firm that gives us access to a pool of participants. Subjects first respond to a survey on socio-demographic characteristics. After the survey, subjects will be divided into two groups, the “observers” and the “observed”. The observed will be asked to decide whether they want to transfer a large sum (100 euro) to an NGO (whose identity will be revealed at the end of the experiment) or to keep a smaller amount for themselves (the actual choices will be implemented with some probability). The choice will be implemented with a 5% probability.
Donation decision
Before making the decision, the participants will be allocated to one of three experimental conditions:
T1 in which their actions are observed by no-one
T2 in which the observed are told their actions will be observed by individuals (the observers), who will evaluate their moral conduct and whose rating will subsequently be transmitted to them
T3 same setting as in T2 except that the observed are told that the observers will play exactly the same game as them before evaluating their moral conduct
In both T2 and T3, the observed will have to see the rating they received from the observers before being able to obtain their payment.

Observers
The observers are accordingly allocated to either of the two treatments (there are no observers in T1):
- in T2 they simply have to rate the behavior of the observed on a morality scale (Passive observers).
- while in T3 they play the same game as the observed before rating the behavior of the observed (Active observers)

Design details

Randomization method
random allocation to treatments (rotation done by the computer)
Randomization unit
individual level
Clusters
1500 individuals
Observations
1500 individuals
Arms
300 by treatment
Primary outcomes
The main outcome of interest is the level of donation by treatment
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcomes are the excuses used by those who don't donate and the evaluations of the actions of the others

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords