The impact of delegation on the frequency of lying: Theory and experimental evidence
How to cite
Bieberstein, Frauke von; Feess, Eberhard. 2022. "The impact of delegation on the frequency of lying: Theory and experimental evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009443. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9443-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Subjects in our online experiment are randomly assigned to groups of three. All group members observe the same outcome of a lottery, which can be HIGH or LOW. The group receives the winning price if and only if the group member in charge reports HIGH. Our experiment has three treatments. (i) In treatment SINGLE, each of the three group members is asked to report the outcome. Each of their reports is then chosen with the same probability of one third to determine the payoff. (ii) In treatment DELEGATION, one subject is randomly chosen to be the first mover (FM). The FM can either report HIGH or LOW, but can also delegate the report to a second mover (SM) who is also randomly chosen. This SM needs to decide between HIGH and LOW.SMs are asked for their report under the assumption that they can actually make a report (i.e. that the FM delegates). (iii) In treatment MULTISTAGE DELEGATION, the SM can delegate as well. If so, the third mover (TM) is asked for the final report. Our main research question is how the frequency of HIGH final reports differs among treatments. We have developed a game theoretical model with moral costs, which occur if and only if the final report is HIGH when the outcome of the lottery is LOW. In our model, moral costs are highest when the own report is HIGH compared to a situation where another group member reports high. This sets incentives to delegate the decision. Our model yields the result that the order of the frequencies among the three treatments depends on the parameters. In particular, it is theoretically possible that the order is non-monotone. Our study is hence not hypothesis-based but explorative.
Intervention
Online experiment. Between-subject design. In treatment SINGLE, all three subjects are in the same role. In the other two treatments, subjects are randomly assigned to the three roles. Each subject makes just one decision, reporting HIGH or LOW, or delegating the report (for FMs in treatment DELEGATION and for FMs and SMs in treatment MULTISTAGE DELEGATION). Subjects also fill out a non-incentivized questionnaire where we ask for gender, age, the belief about how many subjects choose HIGH or LOW when the outcome is LOW (and delegate when applicable), preferences for delegating and being delegated to, and willingness to take risks.
The study will be conducted on Amazon MTurk, a large online platform for surveys and market research. We restrict the sample to participants whose country of residence are the USA, who have at least 500 approved assignments, and whose submissions have been approved in at least 95% of the cases. We impose these restrictions to ensure a high data quality.
Experimental design
Subjects in our online experiment are randomly assigned to groups of three. All group members observe the same outcome of a lottery, which can be HIGH or LOW. The group receives the winning price if and only if the group member in charge reports HIGH. Our experiment has three treatments. (i) In treatment SINGLE, each of the three group members is asked to report the outcome. Each of their reports is then chosen with the same probability of one third to determine the payoff. (ii) In treatment DELEGATION, one subject is randomly chosen to be the first mover (FM). The FM can either report HIGH or LOW, but can also delegate the report to a second mover (SM) who is also randomly chosen. This SM needs to decide between HIGH and LOW.SMs are asked for their report under the assumption that they can actually make a report (i.e. that the FM delegates). (iii) In treatment MULTISTAGE DELEGATION, the SM can delegate as well. If so, the third mover (TM) is asked for the final report.
Design details
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