Strategic response to price discrimination: survey-based profiling versus prediction from seemingly unrelated choices. Causal effect of knowledge about scope of price discrimination on demand for privacy.

How to cite

Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Bo, Inacio; Chen, Li. 2022. "Strategic response to price discrimination: survey-based profiling versus prediction from seemingly unrelated choices. Causal effect of knowledge about scope of price discrimination on demand for privacy.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009440. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9440-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Rustamdjan Hakimov* , Inacio Bo , Li Chen

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009440
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9440-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-05-13 – 2022-05-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9440

Abstract

This project investigates whether participants can strategically misrepresent information used for price discrimination. We create an artificial market, where participants of an experiment can buy a lottery. Prior to observing the price for the lottery, participants fill out a survey. We develop a statistical model which predicts the willingness to pay (WTP) for the lottery based on answers to the survey from the training sample. Based on this estimation, an individualized price is shown to the participants. Before filling out the survey, participants are informed that the answers could be used to determine the price. Thus, they could answer strategically, and right before observing the price, they are offered an option to hide the answers from the algorithm. We compare the ability to strategically bias answers in their favor between treatments that vary the survey: either survey used by insurance companies for risk profiling or survey of movie ratings. We also compare the demand for “hiding information.” In our intervention, we show participants the range of prices that could be realized depending on their answers to the survey, and hypothesize that it will increase the demand for “hiding information.”

Experimental design

Experimental Design (Public)
Training sample data
First, we develop a statistical model (or algorithm) for price discrimination in an artificial market. The good for sale is a lottery with 50% probability of winning £5. In the training sample, we will collect 700 responses to two surveys in random order:
1) Survey similar to the one conveyed by insurance companies (Standard survey). The questions aim to identify the risk preferences of the respondents.
2) Survey, where participants should rate movie genres. (Movies survey).
After that, participants enter the final stage where we elicit the willingness to pay (WTP) for the lottery using multiple price lists. The certain payout varies from £0.2 to £4 in £0.2 increments.
Based on the 700 responses from the training sample we develop two statistical models: the first predicts WTP based on the standard survey, and the second is based on the movies survey.

Baseline treatments
There will be two baseline treatments: Baseline Standard and Baseline Movies. In the main experiment, participants will go only through one of the surveys. Baseline Standard refers to the treatment with Standard survey. Baseline Movies refers to the treatment with Movies survey.
Before the survey, participants are warned that the information from the survey will be used for determining the price for the lottery in a later round of the experiment by a statistical model.
After participating in the survey, but before observing the price, participants can decide whether they want to hide the survey responses from the seller (imitating a private browsing option) for the price of £0.1. In case the participant decides to hide the survey responses, the price will be the one that maximizes revenue, given the reservation value of £1 (aka cost for the firm) and the distribution of WTP in the training sample. We refer to it as anonymous price. Participants will be warned that they will learn both individual and the anonymous price at the end of the experiment, to avoid curiosity motives.
Next, participants have to decide whether to buy the lottery at a given price, which is either determined by the algorithm based on survey responses (if the participants decided not to hide the responses) or anonymous. In the case of buying, the lottery is played out and the payoff of the participant for the last round is £5-p, if won or -p if lost. If negative, the payoff will be deducted from the reward of participants for filling out the survey.

Scope information treatments
There will be two scope information treatments: Scope Standard and Scope Movies.
The experiment runs exactly like the Baseline treatments. But before the survey, additionally to the warning that the information from the survey will be used for determining the price, the participants are informed about the lowest and the highest price that the algorithm can select, given their survey responses.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done by prolific
Randomization unit
participant
Clusters
no clustering
Observations
700 training sample. Each treatment 300 responses. 1200 in total.
Arms
700 training sample. Each treatment 300 responses. 1200 in total.
Primary outcomes
1. Survey responses. We will only be able to compare distributions between treatments and the training data. 2. Decision to hide the response of survey. 3. Buying decisions. 4. Price paid. 5. Contrafactual price in case of an opposite decision of whether to hide the survey answers

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords