Why do farmers sell immediately after harvest when prices are lowest?
How to cite
Campenhout, Bjorn Van; Leocardia, Nabwire; Emmanuel, Hami; Brian, Dillon; Weerdt, Joachim De. 2022. "Why do farmers sell immediately after harvest when prices are lowest?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009410. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9410-1.3
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
It is often observed that smallholder farmers sell most—if not all—of their marketable surplus or cash crops immediately after the harvest to itinerant traders at the farm gate. Selling immediately after the harvest is not optimal. Thin and poorly integrated markets mean that immediately post harvest, prices in excess supply areas drop. Later, during the lean season when some of the farmers run out of stock, prices have recovered, or even increase further since farmers start to buy back. This leads to the “sell low buy high” puzzle (Stephens and Barrett, 2011; Burke et al., 2018). In addition to high supply immediately post harvest, agricultural commodities are often not yet in optimal condition. For instance, in the case of maize, fresh grains are generally not dry enough, requiring further processing and leading to increased risk of rot by the trader. Often, this is used by buyers as a reason to further drive down the price paid to the farmer. In this study, we zoom in on three potential behavioural explanations why farmers seemingly sell at sub-optimal time. One potential explanation is situated at the household expenditure side, and assumes that households face challenges in accurately predictive future expenditures. Such budget neglect leads farmer to sell more early on and save too little for later in the year. A second potential explanation is situates at the household income side. Here the assumption is that farmers face cognitive challenges in making inter-temporal cost benefit calculations (Drexler et al., 2014) and fail to commit to certain thresholds (Ashraf et al., 2006; Duflo et al., 2011).
Intervention
A first intervention tests budget neglect and comprises of an intervention that takes the farmer through a detailed budgeting exercise. The budget exercise will involve three components. A first component uses recall to provide a first approximation of what will be necessary in the future. A second component consists of segmentation, which involves defining categories of expenditures for cognitive ease. Finally, we will look at a range of risks, which involve expenses that are not certain but may materialize. We try as much as possible to attach objective probabilities to these risks and also incorporate this in the budget.
In a second treatment, we will develop, together with the farmer, a detailed plan of how much the farmer will sell over the coming year (per month or per quarter). For each sales event, the farmer will also be asked to commit to a minimum price. This will be done on a special form that farmers can than hang up in their house.
In a third treatment we will develop an intervention where we provide farmers with historical (5 years) monthly price movements for maize, soybean and groundnuts. The price data will be for the market that is closest to the treated household. We will show price movements, but also provide summary statistics like minimum price, maximum price and average price to summarize price distribution data in a few easy to understand figures (Hanna et al., 2014; Drexler et al., 2014). Price data will be obtained from the Malawian Agricultural Commodity Exchange (ACE).
Experimental design
We use a parallel design with 4 treatment arms (one pure control and three treatments).
Design details
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