Pay It Forward: Theory and Experiment

How to cite

Chuan, Amanda; Zhang, Hanzhe. 2022. "Pay It Forward: Theory and Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009407. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9407-1.0

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Amanda Chuan* , Hanzhe Zhang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009407
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9407-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2021-02-23 – 2021-04-01
Countries
United States of America (online on MTurk)
JEL codes
C79, C90, C91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9407

Abstract

People who have received help may be more likely to pay it forward by helping a third party. We use a lab experiment to investigate psychological motivations behind this behavior. We extend the psychological game-theoretic model of Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004) to guide our experimental investigation. Our experiment suggests that altruism and indirect reciprocity are the main reasons that people pay kindness forward. Equity can also play a role, but credit -- the degree that beneficiaries appreciate kindness -- does not. Our experiment and theory improve our understanding of how kind behavior gets passed on among parties that never directly interact, which has implications for the formation of social norms and atmosphere in workplaces, neighborhoods, and communities.

Intervention

Sequential giving games in which P2 can give to P1, who can give to P0. In some game's, P1's decision to give to P0 is contingent on whether P2 gave to P1 first.

Experimental design

Within-subject
Each subject will play sequential giving games. They will first see a dictator game with a bystander. Next, they will see two games in random order. One of the games will allow P1 to give even if P2 did not. One of the games will only allow P1 to give if P2 already gave.

Design details

Randomization method
Qualtrics will randomize the order of the games for subjects
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
400 individuals
Observations
400 individuals
Arms
400 individuals per treatment arm (within-individual design)
Primary outcomes
Whether subjects give at a given node of the game
Secondary outcomes
Subjects' first and second-order beliefs about giving Subjects' stated credit received by each player for each other player's payoff

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords