Leadership Styles and Labor Market Conditions: An Experiment

How to cite

Hong, Ju Yeong; Danilov, Anastasia; Schöttner, Anja. 2022. "Leadership Styles and Labor Market Conditions: An Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009365. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9365-1.2

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Ju Yeong Hong* , Anastasia Danilov , Anja Schöttner

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009365
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9365-1.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2022-10-12 – 2022-12-09
Countries
Germany (Berlin)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9365

Abstract

We study the role of leadership styles and the effect of labor market conditions on the choice of leadership styles via an experimental labor market interaction, where we have participants in the role of managers and workers. We implement the leadership styles as non-monetary, performance contingent reward or punishment in the form of ex-post communication from managers to workers: The content or tone of the communication could be neutral, friendly, or unfriendly contingent on the workers’ performance.

Further details of our experimental design and predictions are included in the attached pdf.

Experimental design

Subjects are either in the role of managers or workers. They make decisions in the context of a single-period, experimental labor market interaction. The context of manager-worker interactions follows a one-sided auction for hiring. Each manager makes one contract offer to hire a worker who accepts the offer and then works on the manager’s project at an exogenously fixed wage. A worker can be hired under only one contract offer‒but is free to reject all offers and remain unhired‒and a manager can only hire one worker who accepts his/her offer. A hired worker earns the fixed wage minus the effort cost. The abstract effort level chosen by the worker determines the chances of binary outcomes of the project, either success or failure, and the effort cost; the higher the effort level, the higher the chances of project success, and the higher the cost. When the project is successful, the manager gets strictly higher project earnings than when the project fails. Both the manager and the worker learn the realization of their project outcomes. However, the manager cannot observe the effort level directly.
A contract offer stipulates each manager’s leadership style, i.e., the style of ex-post communication, contingent on the project outcome. Further details of our experimental design are described in the attached pdf.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomizations are implemented by the computer software, zTree.
Randomization unit
Groups. Participants are randomly assigned to groups and the role of a manager or a worker.
Clusters
32 groups per treatment
Observations
Further details of our experimental design are described in the attached pdf.
Arms
Further details of our experimental design are described in the attached pdf.
Primary outcomes
Managers' choice of leadership styles

Materials

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Keywords