The Impact of Unpredictable Work Schedules on Hourly Workers’ Ability to Predict Their Short-Term Liquidity Demand: Evidence from an Earned Wage Access Fintech Experiment
How to cite
Koepcke, Eric; Cefala, Luisa; Swanson, Nicholas. 2022. "The Impact of Unpredictable Work Schedules on Hourly Workers’ Ability to Predict Their Short-Term Liquidity Demand: Evidence from an Earned Wage Access Fintech Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009362. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9362-1.2
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We partner with an Earned Wage Access (EWA) fintech company to run a survey-based experiment through their app. EWA technology gives workers access to their wages as they are earned, rather than having to wait until payday. EWA serves as an alternative to high-interest forms of short-term credit (e.g., payday loans) and predominantly caters to lower-wage, hourly workers.
Our experiment seeks to answer three questions: (1) Can workers accurately predict how many hours they will work in the future? (2) Can workers accurately predict how much pay they will advance in the future? (3) How much of a role, if any, does misprediction of work hours play in misprediction of pay advanced? Our survey collects workers’ beliefs about work hours and pay advances. Using workers’ actual hours and pay advances, we can answer the first two questions. We develop and employ two treatments in order to answer the third.
Intervention
We run a survey-based experiment. An invitation to our survey is sent through the fintech company’s app.
Survey:
1. The survey collects workers’ beliefs about how many hours they'll work during their next pay period.
2. The survey collects workers’ beliefs about how much pay they'll have advanced to them during their next pay period.
3. In the vein of Allcott et al. (forthcoming), we introduce an incentive to advance less pay during the next pay period. We collect workers' beliefs about pay advances both without and with this incentive. We also use a multiple-price list (MPL) to measure workers’ valuation of this incentive.
The app's administrative data records workers actual work hours and pay advances during their next pay period.
Experimental design
We have three treatment groups in our experiment:
1. A control group is just given the survey described above.
2. An information treatment group is provided with information before they report their work hours and pay advance beliefs.
3. A fixed hours treatment group is asked to report their pay advance beliefs under different work hours outcomes.
Design details
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