Methodology and decision-making for others in voting experiments
How to cite
Mangin, Paul-Emile; Luhan, Wolfgang; Kittel, Bernhard. 2024. "Methodology and decision-making for others in voting experiments." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009351. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9351-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
There is extensive research on optimal election rules, rationality on going to the polls and strategic voting (see, e.g., Kittel, et al., 2014) but little is known about the impact of being elected in itself on politicians’ decisions. Democratically elected leaders should represent the electorate’s interest, but we know that other motivations, such as budget maximization or increasing the probability of being re-elected might crowd out the electorate's best interest.
In this project we will study whether being elected rather than appointed leads politicians to act more in line with social preferences, giving more weight to the electorate’s preferences.
Our Hypotheses are based on a larger social closeness to the group affected by the decision if the decision maker has been elected, as well as reciprocity towards the voters.
As there might be a selection bias of pro-social decision makers via the election method, we will also investigate this possibility and two ways to circumvent this, as well as the possible influence on campaign slogans when the decision is taken before formulating the slogan.
Experimental design
We will use a controlled lab experiment for data collection, implemented at the BaL BARE Laboratory.
Design details
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