Price Incentives for Resource Conservation: Experimental Evidence from Groundwater Irrigation

How to cite

Zucker, Ariel; Hagerty, Nick. 2022. "Price Incentives for Resource Conservation: Experimental Evidence from Groundwater Irrigation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009337. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9337-1.2

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Ariel Zucker* , Nick Hagerty

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009337
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9337-1.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2022-06-01 – 2024-12-01
Countries
India (Gujarat)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9337

Abstract

Groundwater is a vital input to agricultural production worldwide, but a widespread lack of effective regulation leads to overconsumption and depletion, while water supplies are becoming scarcer and less reliable in many regions. We will evaluate a program of price incentives for voluntary groundwater conservation among smallholder farmers in Gujarat, India, where water (and the electricity used to pump it) is scarce and unregulated. To do so, we install meters and offer payments for reduced groundwater pumping in a randomized controlled trial. First, we use the price variation introduced by this program to estimate the price elasticity of groundwater demand, a key parameter required for efficient regulation by any means. Then, we evaluate conservation payments as a potentially useful policy tool in itself, measuring its treatment effects, spillovers, and cost-effectiveness. Pilot evidence confirms that conservation payments are feasible and suggests effects on water use could be large.

Intervention

Farmers receiving the intervention will receive a conservation credit – a financial incentive – for reducing their monthly water usage below an individual-specific benchmark.

Experimental design

To answer our research questions, we will conduct an RCT of incentives to promote irrigation efficiency in agriculture in Saurashtra, a region in the state of Gujarat, India. We aim to test the impact of marginal resource conservation incentives on energy and water conservation.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
farmer water-sharing group (this will be a single farmer if the farmer does not share a groundwater irrigation source with others, or a group of neighboring farmers who share a groundwater irrigation source)
Clusters
1340 farmer-sharing groups
Observations
1742 farmers
Arms
871 farmers Control 871 farmers Conservation Credits (Treatment), of which: -25% high payment high benchmark -25% high payment low benchmark -25% low payment high benchmark -25% low payment low benchmark
Primary outcomes
irrigation intensity

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Keywords