Job Preference Signaling and Matching Efficiency: Experiment in a Large Online Job Market

How to cite

Matsuda, Norihiko. 2022. "Job Preference Signaling and Matching Efficiency: Experiment in a Large Online Job Market." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009327. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9327-2.1

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Norihiko Matsuda*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009327
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9327-2.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2022-02-01 – 2023-12-31
Countries
Bangladesh ()
JEL codes
D82, J64, J68, M51, O12, O25
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9327

Abstract

Asymmetric information about job applicants' preference—i.e., how interested they are in the jobs they apply for—may cause inefficiency in job matching. The inefficiency can be theoretically reduced by credible signaling of job preference. To empirically examine the effects of job preference signaling, we conduct a large experiment in Bangladesh’s largest online job portal. By applying a novel and ethical randomization design, our experiment estimates the effects of signaling on application-, jobseeker-, and employer-level outcomes. The signaling mechanism in the experiment allows jobseekers to express their interest to few employers. It is essentially identical to what has been implemented in the economist job market by American Economic Association.

Intervention

Our intervention is a job preference signaling mechanism that allows job applicants to express their interest to few employers. It is essentially identical to the one implemented in the Job Openings for Economists by the American Economic Association. Below are specifics about our intervention:
- Endowment of signal: Each jobseeker is endowed with one signal every week. If a signal is not used during the given week, the signal is lost, not carried over to next weeks.
- Timing: Jobseekers can send signals when and after they apply for jobs. Signals can be sent to any active jobs, regardless of whether jobs are posted in the same week or previous weeks. Signals will be attached to job application and delivered to employers immediately.
- Once signals are submitted, they cannot be cancelled.
- No more than one signal can be sent to any job.

The experiment is conducted in the entirety of a large online job portal. Every jobseeker is endowed with a signal every week, which can be sent to any active job ad.

Experimental design

The experiment takes place in the entire job portal. During a 4-month experiment period, every jobseeker can send one signal per week. They can send signals to any active jobs when and after they apply for jobs.

Employers can view whether applicants send signals to their jobs. More specifically, on the employer account page, employers can first view the list of all applicants. This list shows summary information about each applicant including whether s/he sent a signal. Then, if employers click an applicant from the list, employers can open his/her application package and view his/her detailed information.

The data are the following:
1. Administrative data of the job portal: The data include the information about jobs, employers, jobseekers, applications, and signals available in the job portal.
2. Baseline online survey data: We conduct baseline online surveys of jobseekers and employers. The survey population is all active jobseekers and employers registered in the job portal.
3. Endline online survey data: We conduct online surveys to collect jobseekers and employers approximately 2 months after the end of the experiment period. The survey population is all active jobseekers and employers registered in the job portal.
4. Endline phone/video interview survey data: We conduct phone- or video-call interviews of employers twice approximately 2 and 9 months after the end of the experiment period. Note that the endline surveys are subject to funding availability.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in the job portal
Randomization unit
Firms
Clusters
8000 firms
Observations
[Administrative Data] 8,000 firms; 20,000 job ads; 500,000 jobseekers; 10 million applications [Online Survey] 500 firms; 50,000 jobseekers [Phone/Video Interview Survey] 2,000 firms
Arms
4000 firms
Primary outcomes
[Job application-level outcomes] - Whether an application is viewed - Whether an applicant is shortlisted [Jobseeker-level outcomes] - The number of applications that are viewed by employers - The number of applications that are shortlisted - Being employed - Job match quality: (i) monthly salary; (ii) how well worker’s skills fit his/her job; (iii) how interesting a current job is; (iv) overall job satisfaction; (v) job tenure [Job/employer-level outcomes] - The number of applications viewed - The number of applications shortlisted - Whether a position is filled; the number of hires - Job match quality: (i) employer’s subjective assessment on hired workers’ skills; (ii) subjective assessment on workers’ motivation; (iii) employer’s overall satisfaction on hired workers; (iv) worker retention - Employer’s satisfaction on recruitment experience in the job portal
Secondary outcomes
[Job application-level outcomes] - Whether an applicant is hired [Jobseeker-level outcomes] - Aspired wage in the future - Life satisfaction - Whether looking for a job in last 4 weeks - Self-perceived job search prospects: the percent chance of finding a full-time job within 6 months

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Keywords