Job Preference Signaling and Matching Efficiency: Experiment in a Large Online Job Market
How to cite
Matsuda, Norihiko. 2022. "Job Preference Signaling and Matching Efficiency: Experiment in a Large Online Job Market." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009327. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9327-2.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Asymmetric information about job applicants' preference—i.e., how interested they are in the jobs they apply for—may cause inefficiency in job matching. The inefficiency can be theoretically reduced by credible signaling of job preference. To empirically examine the effects of job preference signaling, we conduct a large experiment in Bangladesh’s largest online job portal. By applying a novel and ethical randomization design, our experiment estimates the effects of signaling on application-, jobseeker-, and employer-level outcomes. The signaling mechanism in the experiment allows jobseekers to express their interest to few employers. It is essentially identical to what has been implemented in the economist job market by American Economic Association.
Intervention
Our intervention is a job preference signaling mechanism that allows job applicants to express their interest to few employers. It is essentially identical to the one implemented in the Job Openings for Economists by the American Economic Association. Below are specifics about our intervention:
- Endowment of signal: Each jobseeker is endowed with one signal every week. If a signal is not used during the given week, the signal is lost, not carried over to next weeks.
- Timing: Jobseekers can send signals when and after they apply for jobs. Signals can be sent to any active jobs, regardless of whether jobs are posted in the same week or previous weeks. Signals will be attached to job application and delivered to employers immediately.
- Once signals are submitted, they cannot be cancelled.
- No more than one signal can be sent to any job.
The experiment is conducted in the entirety of a large online job portal. Every jobseeker is endowed with a signal every week, which can be sent to any active job ad.
Experimental design
The experiment takes place in the entire job portal. During a 4-month experiment period, every jobseeker can send one signal per week. They can send signals to any active jobs when and after they apply for jobs.
Employers can view whether applicants send signals to their jobs. More specifically, on the employer account page, employers can first view the list of all applicants. This list shows summary information about each applicant including whether s/he sent a signal. Then, if employers click an applicant from the list, employers can open his/her application package and view his/her detailed information.
The data are the following:
1. Administrative data of the job portal: The data include the information about jobs, employers, jobseekers, applications, and signals available in the job portal.
2. Baseline online survey data: We conduct baseline online surveys of jobseekers and employers. The survey population is all active jobseekers and employers registered in the job portal.
3. Endline online survey data: We conduct online surveys to collect jobseekers and employers approximately 2 months after the end of the experiment period. The survey population is all active jobseekers and employers registered in the job portal.
4. Endline phone/video interview survey data: We conduct phone- or video-call interviews of employers twice approximately 2 and 9 months after the end of the experiment period. Note that the endline surveys are subject to funding availability.
Design details
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