The effect of corruption on tax evasion

How to cite

Verbel, Yuliet; Parra, Daniel. 2022. "The effect of corruption on tax evasion." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009322. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9322-1.2

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Yuliet Verbel* , Daniel Parra

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009322
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9322-1.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2022-05-16 – 2022-09-16
Countries
Germany (Berlin)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9322

Abstract

Previous research on tax compliance has shown that individuals’ decision to pay taxes is shaped not only by intrinsic motivation but also by extrinsic factors like perceived fairness of the tax system, reliability of the political system, and, more specifically, the perceived level of corruption in the society. In this study, we examine whether an environment of widespread corruption makes taxpayers evade more taxes. We plan to implement treatment variations to disentangle whether the effect of corruption on tax evasion is explained by the damage to the public good that corruption generates or just by having a corrupt administration in place. We divide our study into two experiments. The first one is a Public Officials experiment used as input to create an objective prior about the level of corruption by collecting Public Officials' decisions of misappropriation. The second experiment is a tax evasion game where participants can lie about their income after learning the level of corruption in their group.

Intervention

We study whether an environment with a high level of corruption influences tax evasion and whether the loss of resources from the public good can explain that effect if any.

Experimental design

We study whether corruption influences tax evasion and whether the loss of resources in the public good can explain that effect if any. For this purpose, we plan to implement a tax evasion game with groups of four participants: three taking the role of taxpayers and one taking the role of official. All participants earn money in an initial stage where they perform an encoding task for 5 minutes. The taxpayers can lie about their earned income, and the official can take money from the collected taxes. In order to identify the causal effect of corruption on tax evasion, taxpayers will be informed about the level of corruption in their group before they make the reporting decision. The money collected for taxes is augmented by an efficiency factor and is transferred to the organization Keep Britain Tidy which is a real public good for UK residents. If an official decides to take money from the collected taxes, that generates a loss of resources in the public good.

In the case of the officials, after they earn their income, they decide whether they want to take a fixed amount of £0.63 from the taxes collected. We gather the taking decisions of the officials and create two groups, one with low corruption (fewer officials in the group that decided to take) and one with high corruption (majority of officials in the group that decided to take). In the case of the taxpayers, after they earn their income, they are informed about the type of group where the official they are matched with comes from (low/high corruption), and then they are asked to report their income for taxation. The income reported is taxed at a rate of 35%.

We plan to implement treatment variations to disentangle whether the effect of corruption on tax evasion, if any, is explained by the loss of resources in the public good that corruption generates or just by having a corrupt administration in place. For this, we will implement two more treatments (low/high lottery) where the officials instead of actively deciding whether to take the £0.63, a lottery will randomly determine whether they win £0.63 or not. In this sense, the same loss of resources occurs but the cause differs in comparison to the treatments where they actively decided whether to take the money.

Final payments are as follows: officials’ payoff is their earned income plus £0.63 if they decide to take it or if the lottery assigns it to them, otherwise, the payoff is only their earned income. And taxpayers’ payoff is their earned income minus 35% of their reported income.

The experiment will be neutrally framed, which implies that participants’ roles will be labeled as Participant A for officials and Participant B for taxpayers.

From hereafter, the names of the treatments where there are high/low levels of corruption given the decision to take of the officials will be Choice-High and Choice-Low. The names of the treatments where a lottery determines if an official takes or not will be Random-High and Random-Low.

Hypotheses
H1: The evasion rate will be higher in Choice-High than in Choice-Low.
H2: The evasion rate will be higher in Choice-High than in Random-High.
H3: The evasion rate will be higher in Random-High than in Random-Low.
H4: The evasion rate will be equal in Choice-Low than in Random-Low.

Secondary Hypothesis on appropriateness rates
H1: Individuals will consider it more socially appropriate to evade taxes in Choice-High than in Choice-Low.
H2: Individuals will consider it more socially appropriate to evade taxes in Choice-High than in Random-High.
H3: Individuals will consider it more socially appropriate to evade taxes in Random-High than in Random-Low.
H4: Individuals will consider it equally socially appropriate to evade taxes in Choice-Low than in Random-Low.

Note: In version 1 of this pre-registration we do not know the exact distribution of the Public officials for High/Low treatments. The distribution will depend on the decisions of Public officials in the Choice treatment.

Note - update: After implementing the Choice treatment for Public Officials, we gathered their decisions, along with the decisions of Public Officials in our pilot, and obtain the distribution of Public Officials for High/Low treatments. The distribution in a High treatment is that 9 out of 10 Public Officials in a group take/win the £0.63. The distribution in a Low treatment is that 2 out of 10 Public Officials in a group take/win the £0.63.

Design details

Randomization method
We will randomly assign treatments ex-ante at the individual level.
Randomization unit
Individual-level.
Clusters
200 groups of four participants. Each group with one Public Official and three Tax Payers.
Observations
800 participants in total from which we obtain 600 independent observations of income reporting.
Arms
50 Public Officials + 150 Tax Payers in Choice-High 50 Public Officials + 150 Tax Payers in Choice-Low 50 Public Officials + 150 Tax Payers in Random-High 50 Public Officials + 150 Tax Payers in Random-Low
Primary outcomes
Evasion Rate = 1 - reported income/actual income Evasion Size = actual income - reported income Evasion dummy = 1 if Evasion Size>0 Note: in the case of Evasion Size < 0 we will consider this as overreporting and will exclude the corresponding observations before the data analysis.
Secondary outcomes
Appropriateness rate of different income report decisions for tax purposes.

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Keywords