Hard vs Soft Ultimatums
How to cite
Hyndman, Kyle; Karagözoğlu, Emin. 2022. "Hard vs Soft Ultimatums." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009319. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9319-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Negotiation scholars agree on the following recommendation: avoid (hard) ultimatums and do not leave your opponent without any options. Using online experiments on Prolific, we will investigate the effect of the availability of soft ultimatums (ultimatum offers that specify a range of amounts – instead of a specific number – that the proposer is willing to give to the responder) on offers made, the likelihood of acceptance, and responders’ satisfaction and fairness perceptions of the negotiated outcome. There are two agents: a proposer and a responder. In the control treatment, they play the standard ultimatum game, where the proposer offers an amount of the given pie, and the responder accepts or rejects. In the experimental treatment, proposer can —at his/her will— specify a minimum amount and a maximum amount s/he would be willing to give to the responder. We are interested in the following markers: (i) how frequently is this option used, (ii) does the availability of this option influence the offers made by proposers (e.g., how do the maximum offers in the experimental treatment compare with the offers in the control treatment), (iii) how does the rejection rate for maximum offers in the experimental treatment compare to the rejection rate of equivalent offers in the control treatment, and (iv) how do the satisfaction and fairness perceptions of responders in the experimental treatment compare with those in the control treatment (for comparable offers)?
Intervention
The purpose of our intervention is to understand the influence of soft ultimatums on (i) offers made by proposers; (ii) the acceptance/rejection behavior of responders; (iii) their satisfaction with the outcome of bargaining'; and (iv) how fair they perceive the offer/outcome. To study this, we compare agents’ behavior (and answers to some post-experimental questions) across two treatments that vary the availability/presence of soft ultimatums.
Experimental design
The experiment has two treatments: standard ultimatum game (UG - control treatment) and modified ultimatum game (MUG - experimental treatment). These games are implemented using the direct-response method. We explicitly avoid implementing the strategy method since we believe that the treatment variation we implement can make a behavioral impact when the responders are in a hot emotional state. The experiment has a between-subjects design, i.e., each subject will participate only in one of the treatments. We decided against a within-subject design since the treatment variation is simple and transparent, which can easily reveal the research question and lead to an experimenter demand effect. The game is one-shot. Each subject only plays one role, and roles are randomly assigned with equal probabilities. There will be comprehension questions before the game. Only the participants who answer these questions correctly can proceed with the experiment. Instructions are common knowledge. The experiment will be conducted on Prolific.
Design details
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