Information and Competition in Lemon Markets: Improving Safety in Informal Transit

How to cite

Lane, Gregory; Kelley, Erin; Schonholzer, David. 2022. "Information and Competition in Lemon Markets: Improving Safety in Informal Transit." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009315. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9315-1.0

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Gregory Lane* , Erin Kelley , David Schonholzer

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009315
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9315-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2018-09-01 – 2019-10-31
Countries
Kenya (Nairobi)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9315

Abstract

Road traffic accidents in poorly regulated public transit is a leading cause of death in low- and middle-income countries. We study how providing information about bus safety to passengers affects the demand and supply of safer public transit when firms have market power. We collect measures of safe driving for buses belonging to five firms operating at one of the busiest long-range bus stations in Nairobi, Kenya, using a newly developed tracking device. In a first experiment, we privately inform passengers approaching the station which firm is the safest choice. Passengers do not respond to the treatment, although they are willing to switch for a small subsidy. In a second experiment, we then provide a public signal to both passengers and firms that buses are now being tracked. Passengers receiving private information about bus safety now respond by choosing the safe firm, and some firms provide safer services. We rationalize these effects in a game-theoretic model of firms facing different costs of providing safe services and derive welfare estimates of alternative equilibria. The model implies that the welfare effects of information interventions crucially depend on the nature of the market equilibrium.

Experimental design

We place GPS trackers in 60 buses (5 companies) operating from a popular station in downtown Nairobi and monitor instances of speeding, sharp-braking, and average speed. We then intercept over 2500 passengers as they enter the station and randomly provide them with one of two pamphlets. The first pamphlet reminds passengers of the importance of safe driving in general. The second pamphlet displays which bus company was awarded the top safety performer title that month, based on the monitoring data. To determine passengers demand for safety, we also randomly offer a “subsidy treatment” that gives passengers incentives for taking the safest bus. Finally, half way through the experiment we positioned large signs across the station to advertise our pamphlets and tracking efforts publicly for both firms and passengers.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Individual (passenger)
Clusters
2500 passengers
Observations
2500 passengers
Arms
2500 passengers
Primary outcomes
Passenger choice of bus, safety events for buses (firms)

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords