Scientific information as a coordination device in voting over climate policy instruments. Evidence from a survey experiment with real climate impacts
How to cite
Jarke-Neuert, Johannes; Frondel, Manuel; Perino, Grischa; Flörchinger, Daniela. 2022. "Scientific information as a coordination device in voting over climate policy instruments. Evidence from a survey experiment with real climate impacts." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009307. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9307-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
While first-order beliefs about a policy’s impacts shape preferences over policy options, how these preferences are expressed in ballots or other voting contexts is often influenced by strategic considerations. Against this backround, two questions are addressed in this study: (1) How do first and second-order beliefs on the effectiveness of climate policy instruments affect policy choices in collective relative to individual decisions? (2) Is scientific information able to co-ordinate second-order beliefs and choices in ballots?
In this experiment participants can choose between real climate mitigation options that mimic real-world climate policy instruments. We compare an abstract mitigation option, i.e. the reduction of the cap in the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS), with a concrete, intuitive and prominent option, i.e. the reductions of emissions from a coal-fired power plant in Germany, and with a linear combination of the two. Subjects sequentially choose both individually and collectively. The collective choice is implemented in the form of a ballot where one of the three mitigation options must obtain at least 50 percent of votes to be implemented. It is designed to determine the role of strategic considerations in voting decisions on specific climate policies and whether scientific information on instrument effectiveness can serve as a coordination device. It allows testing whether collective choices respond more sensitive to commonly shared information than individual choices.
Two between-subjects conditions are compared. In a control condition, no further information on the true effect of each alternative on total CO2 emissions is given. In a treatment condition, information on the true effect of each alternative on total CO2 emissions under the current rules of the EU ETS are given before subjects make their first decision. Four hypotheses are tested with this design: (1) In both conditions, first-order beliefs better explain individual choices than votes, and second-order beliefs better explain votes than choices. (2) Without additional information on the climate effectiveness of options, participants are less likely to vote for the abstract and less prominent option to reduce the number of allowances in the EU ETS in the collective decision context than in the individual choice. (3) In the collective choice and with additional information on the climate effectiveness of options, allowance retirement is chosen more often than in the individual choice, and more often than in the collective choice without additional information on the climate effectiveness of options. (4) Collective choices tend to favor mixes over extremes, i.e. the linear combination option is chosen more likely in the collective vs. the individual choice.
Intervention
In this experiment participants can choose between real climate mitigation options that mimic real-world climate policy instruments. We compare an abstract mitigation option, i.e. the reduction of the cap in the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS), with a concrete, intuitive and prominent option, i.e. the reductions of emissions from a coal-fired power plant in Germany, and with a linear combination of the two. In the individual choice situation, the participants in our experiment are free to choose between the following four options:
• A: Reducing the number of allowances in the EU ETS by 10 tons of CO2.
• B: Reducing the emissions from a coal-fired power plant in Germany by 10 tons.
• C: Mixed option with 5 tons each via A and B .
• D: No climate action.
In the collective choice situation, the options are the same but all CO2 reductions are multiplied by ten, i.e. each mitigation option amounts to one hundred tons of CO2. This is to keep the total impact of all decisions within a treatment roughly constant across individual and collective decisions. Ten (one hundred) tons of CO2 are roughly equivalent to the carbon footprint of one (ten) average German citizen(s). Participants are informed that decisions are real in that the choices of randomly selected participants will be implemented with the help of the operator of a coal-fired power plant and an NGO that retires EU ETS allowances . Furthermore, we elicit participants' beliefs about the effectiveness of all options in reducing total GHG emission in the EU.
The collective choice is implemented in the form of a ballot where one of the three mitigation options must obtain at least 50 percent of votes to be implemented. It is designed to determine the role of strategic considerations in voting decisions on specific climate policies and whether scientific information on instrument effectiveness can serve as a coordination device. It allows testing whether collective choices respond more sensitive to commonly shared information than individual choices.
Each subject makes two sequential decisions with the following within-subjects variation: in the first decision (d=1), subjects choose individually and independently between alternatives A, B, C and D. In the second decision (d=2), subjects vote individually and independently for one of the alternatives and the choice is implemented collectively by majority rule, as described above.
There are two between-subjects conditions. In the control condition COLCTL (code z=0), no further information on the true effect of each alternative on total CO2 emissions is given. In the COLCR (code z=1) condition, information on the true effect of each alternative on total CO2 emissions under the current rules of the EU ETS are given before subjects make their first decision.
Experimental design
See supporting document.
Design details
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