The effect of incentives in a puzzle-solving game

How to cite

Silz-Carson, Katherine; Tucholski, Heidi; Thorson, Maya; Kang, Amy. 2022. "The effect of incentives in a puzzle-solving game." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009301. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9301-3.0

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Katherine Silz-Carson* , Heidi Tucholski , Maya Thorson , Amy Kang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009301
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9301-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2022-08-08 – 2022-12-16
Countries
United States of America ()
JEL codes
C91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9301

Abstract

Competition tied in with self-evaluation can trigger dishonesty in even the most honest person. In many professional settings, including in some parts of the United States military, subordinates are required to provide significant input about their work performance to their superiors as a part of the performance appraisal process.  In some cases, subordinates are expected to draft their own performance appraisals.  These appraisals may then be used to rank-order subordinates to determine who receives a limited number of rewards, such as a “Definitely Promote” (DP) rating of an officer in the United States military. The objective of this study is to examine the effects of two alternative incentive systems designed to simulate alternative performance reward systems on stated performance in a matrix-solving game.

Intervention

The objective of this study is to examine the effects of two alternative incentive systems on stated performance in a matrix-solving game . In this game, participants are given a set of 20 matrices containing 12 numbers each. For each matrix, participants are asked to select the two numbers that sum to 10. After completing all 20 matrices, participants will report on a separate page the total number of matrices that they believe that they solved correctly. Participants will be compensated based on their stated number of matrices solved using one of two possible incentive systems. Participants will be randomly assigned to one of two incentive systems to determine their experimental compensation.

Experimental design

The objective of this study is to examine the effects of two alternative incentive systems on stated performance in a matrix-solving game . In this game, participants are given a set of 20 matrices containing 12 numbers each. For each matrix, participants are asked to select the two numbers that sum to 10. After completing all 20 matrices, participants will report on a separate page the total number of matrices that they believe that they solved correctly. Participants will be compensated based on their stated number of matrices solved using one of two possible incentive systems. Participants will be randomly assigned to one of two incentive systems to determine their experimental compensation.

Design details

Randomization method
Participants will be randomly assigned to one of two incentive systems by a computer.
Randomization unit
Random assignment occurs at the individual participant level
Clusters
N/A - observations in this experimental design are not clustered
Observations
150 individual participants - 75 per incentive system
Arms
75 individual participants in incentive system #1 75 individual participants in incentive system #2
Primary outcomes
Outcome 1: Stated performance in Incentive System #1 Outcome 2: Stated performance in Incentive System #2

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords