A Field Experiment on Tax Avoidance

How to cite

Perez-Truglia, Ricardo; Holz, Justin; Zentner, Alejandro. 2022. "A Field Experiment on Tax Avoidance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009298. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9298-1.0

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Ricardo Perez-Truglia* , Justin Holz , Alejandro Zentner

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009298
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9298-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2022-04-22 – 2022-12-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C93, H26, K34, K42, Z13, I22
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9298

Abstract

We designed a field experiment to study tax avoidance among households. The subjects in our field experiment are households who pay property taxes and face the opportunity to legally reduce their property taxes via filing a tax appeal. We invite a sample of households' to complete a survey. Within a survey, we conduct an information-provision experiment. We then measure how the information affects their posterior beliefs and the subsequent decision to appeal property taxes (based on administrative records).

Intervention

We study households who were about to have the opportunity to protest the tax assessments of their homes. We sent letters to 100,432 of those households to invite them to participate in a survey. Within the survey, we conduct an information-provision experiment.

Experimental design

We sent letters to a sample of 100,432 households from Dallas County (Texas) who were about to have the opportunity to protest the tax assessments of their homes. A sample of the letter is attached to this pre-registration. Our letters included an invitation to participate in an online survey. A sample of the survey instrument is attached to this pre-registration as well.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Household
Clusters
100,432 households will be invited to the survey. These households are a subsample of the universe of all homeowners in Dallas County, Texas. We arrived to this subsample by applying a number of filters (e.g., focusing on single-family homes, excluding business properties). We originally selected 100,616, but 198 were dropped by the mailing company by using the NCOA (Change of Address) system. We would like to clarify that some additional households will need to be dropped from the subject pool due to reasons that we cannot observe ex-ante. - Most importantly, some households may respond to the survey after they protested or after the window to submit a protest had been closed (in which cases, by construction, the information provided in the survey could not affect their choices). - Some households may sign with a tax agent before they respond to our survey, in which case they will be excluded from the sample. - Following prior information-provision studies, we'll exclude subjects who are outliers in terms of their prior misperceptions. If a respondent is extremely off in his or her prior belief, that is a sign that the household is either not paying attention or misunderstood the question.
Observations
Since we do not know the response rate in advance, the number of subjects participating in the survey can be anywhere from 0 to 100,432. Based on the response rate in a previous experiment (3.7%, from Nathan et al., 2020 and 3.6% from Giaccobasso et al., 2022), our best guess is that we'll have around 3,600 responses. References: Giaccobasso, M.; Nathan, B.; Perez-Truglia, R. and Zentner, A. (2022). Where Do My Tax Dollars Go? Tax Morale Effects of Perceived Government Spending. NBER Working Paper No. 29789. Nathan, B.; Perez-Truglia, R. and Zentner, A. (2020). My Taxes are Too Darn High: Why Do Households Protest their Taxes? NBER Working Paper No. 27816.
Arms
We cross-randomized subjects to receive three pieces of information, with 50% probability each. So 1/8 of the sample will receive all three pieces of information, 1/8 of the sample will receive the first piece of information only, 1/8 will receive the second piece of information only, ..., and 1/8 of the sample will receive no information.
Primary outcomes
The main outcome is a dummy variable indicating whether the household protested or not by the deadline (May 16th, 2022).
Secondary outcomes
Right after the information-provision, the survey includes a few questions that could be used as outcomes. A sample of the full survey instrument is attached to this application. The most important survey outcome is the intention to protest. This outcome can potentially pick up transitory effects of the information and also allows us to compare the stated intentions to protest in the survey versus the revealed actions in the administrative data. We have another way of measuring the intention to protest indirectly, through the usage of aid provided at the end of our survey (more details below). There is another secondary outcome that is quite important. At the end of the survey, we use a willingness-to-pay (WTP) exercise to measure whether the household wants to help other households file a tax protest. We elicit this WTP twice (in random order): the WTP to help a household in the richest 1% of households, and the WTP to help a household in the poorest 1% of households. These two outcomes allows us to test whether the beliefs affect not only the household's intention to file a protest, but also the household's views as to weather rich and poor households should protest.

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Keywords