Effort Transparency and Fairness
How to cite
Demiral, Elif; Buchanan, Joy; Saglam, Umit. 2022. "Effort Transparency and Fairness." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009291. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9291-1.1
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
In many situations, information asymmetries arise and influence human behavior. Such cases are widespread in hierarchical work settings. For example, a manager can have more precise knowledge of the value of worker output than the workers themselves do. This information asymmetry may then be carried over to the decisions executed by the manager involving the allocation of resources. If individual contributions are imperfectly known, the allocation of resources, such as compensation, career promotions, and bonus distributions, may be enacted unfairly. For example, in a teamwork setting, with imperfect information on individual performance, one party would have an incentive to take advantage of others' hard work (Chaw et al., 1988). Further underscoring this from an organizational standpoint, such secrecy and unfair behavior can result in a decline in work effort (Nai et al., 2020). If workers know that the reward can be less than their marginal value of effort, this will result in the effort level being inferior. In this project, we aim to address how information asymmetry affects fairness behavior in endowment allocation and worker performance. We plan to test this with an online experiment using a dictator game with joint endowments.
Experimental design
Our experimental design involves two players: A, the dictator, and B, the recipient. Participants are randomly assigned one of these roles at the start of the experiment. The experiment involves two stages. The first stage is a real-effort stage where the participants perform a simple counting task. Each correct answer in this part contributes to a joint endowment to be shared in the second stage (where each correct answer adds $0.10 to the joint endowment). The second stage of the experiment involves a dictator game with taking.
The design embodies two treatments. In our control (transparent) treatment, both players' contributions to the joint endowment are common knowledge in the second stage. Both the dictator (player A) and the recipient (player B) have perfect information about their own and the opponent's performance. The next treatment involves imperfect information (nontransparent), and only player A (dictator) knows the performance and contribution of each player to the joint endowment. Player B receives no information regarding their performance. In the second stage, the dictator (player A) distributes the joint endowment between themself and player B. The experiment then concludes with a questionnaire collecting participants' beliefs (such as beliefs about their own and the opponent's performance) and demographics.
The experiment will be an online experiment using Prolific.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.