Mobile Common Pool Resources: Theory and Experiment on Resource-user Behavior

How to cite

Schaap, Robbert-Jan; Beaud, Mickael; Dubois, Dimitri; Willinger, Marc; Quérou, Nicolas. 2022. "Mobile Common Pool Resources: Theory and Experiment on Resource-user Behavior." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009227. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9227-1.0

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Robbert-Jan Schaap* , Mickael Beaud , Dimitri Dubois , Marc Willinger , Nicolas Quérou

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009227
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9227-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-11-01 – 2023-03-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
Q2, C72, C91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9227

Abstract

Common-pool resources (CPR) such as fish stocks, hunt and aquifers are not necessarily spatially restricted to one country or management area. In many cases the resource is mobile and can freely move between areas. As a consequence the extraction of a resource in one area can affect the abundance of the resource in other areas. This spatial externality can cause inefficient management and create tensions over use rights, in particular when centralized management is not feasible and several owners manage the resource unilaterally. Here we outline a theory informed lab experiment, with the aim of improving our understanding of the behaviors and biases of decision makers in these mobile common pool resource dilemmas (Mobile-CPR).

In this project we have two general research questions. First, to what extent does extraction behavior in the lab differ from the derived theoretical predictions, and second, what mechanisms cause these potential differences. More specifically we aim to disentangle the role of other-regarding behavior, the spatial strategic interaction and confusion on the extraction levels of decision makers and their divergence from the equilibrium strategies.

Intervention

The experiment features 3 treatments:

1: Two participants are matched. Both players are active and choose their levels of escapement in each period.

2: Two participants are matched. The active player chooses their level of escapement in each period. The passive player has an exogenously imposed fixed level of escapement.

3: One participant is matched with a computer. The active player is the participant, who chooses their level of escapement in each period. The passive player is the computer and has exogenously imposed fixed level of escapement.

Experimental design

Participants play a mobile common pool resource game. In this game a resource stock is distributed over 2 patches. Each patch is managed by either a human or a computer player, this depends on the treatment. The participants are assigned to one of the patches and have to manage the patch for a game lasting 4 periods. In each period the participant chooses a level of escapement for their patch. The resource stock is dynamic and grows between periods.

Design details

Randomization method
Done by computer
Randomization unit
The treatment is assigned on the experimental session level.
Clusters
120 pairs of laboratory participants
Observations
240 laboratory participants
Arms
40 pairs of laboratory participants per treatment
Primary outcomes
The level of escapement chosen by participants.
Secondary outcomes
1. Deviation from subgame-perfect nash equilibrium. 2. Deviation from socially efficient benchmark. 3. Initial period with a positive harvest.

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Keywords