Understanding the Costs of Hiring Women in Pakistan
How to cite
Shibuya, Sakina; Tirmazee, Zunia. 2022. "Understanding the Costs of Hiring Women in Pakistan." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009222. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9222-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Pakistan continues to experience low female labor force participation, despite its government’s efforts and improvement in the past decades. While there has been much advancement in understanding the issue, the literature has focused on investigating women’s constraints in obtaining out-of-home employment. This paper, in contrast, asks: what deters firms from hiring women? We hypothesize that there are economic and non-economic integration costs in employing women. For instance, physical investment in a company facility to accommodate women is considered economic costs, and reputation costs of norm incompliance due to hiring women as non-economic ones. This paper contributes to the literature on FLFP by examining the rarely investigated relationship between social norms and hiring decisions. By understanding the extent to which social constraints to female hires bind, policymakers can better design policies and programs to promote women’s economic empowerment in Pakistan.
Intervention
To reveal firms' preference to hire women and their top managers' willingness to comply with the social norm of strict physical separation of the sexes. We use a hypothetical choice method and a behavioral game with the Becker-Degroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism.
Experimental design
Hypothetical Choice Method:
We use the hypothetical-choice method to reveal firms’ preference to hire women. The basic concept of this method is the following. All respondents are shown a profile of a hypothetical company, A. Throughout this section, they are asked to think of themselves as the top manager of this hypothetical firm. As the top manager of Company A, they are tasked to fill ten sawing positions. They are then shown various scenarios in which some of the five economic costs associated with
hiring women are paid for by a special lottery and do not have to be paid for by Company A. Under each of these cost environments, they are asked to report the probability of filling the ten sawing positions with women as opposed to men.
Marble Sorting Game:
We conduct a marble sorting game with the Becker-Degroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al., 1964) to elicit top managers’ willingness to comply with social norms that idealize strict physical separation of the sexes.
In this game, a top manager is asked to sort marbles for a short period of time for a monetary prize. The prize is determined by the quantity he sorts in the given time multiplied by a fixed rate. He is also offered a helper who can help him sort more marbles, thus increasing his prize earnings. Randomly chosen, 90 % of the sample is offered a female helper. If the female helper joins him to play the game, the quantity sorted by her times a different fixed rate will be given to him. In sum, his prize earnings, if he plays with the female helper, is the sum of the contributions by him and the female helper.
He is then asked to report the lowest rate at which he is willing to play this game with the female helper through the BDM mechanism. This is the rate that may be used to convert the female helper’s contribution into a monetary prize. However, whether the top manager plays with the female helper and the rate used to convert her sorted quantity to a monetary prize is determined by a randomly drawn rate. This rate is drawn after the top manager reveals his lowest willing rate. If the randomly drawn rate is greater than or equal to his willing rate, he plays the game with the female helper and uses the randomly drawn rate for her. If it is less than his willing rate, he plays alone. This random drawing is the key aspect of the BDM mechanism; it induces truth-telling because the top manager has no control over if he gets to play the game with the female helper.
The rest is offered a male helper, which produces a comparison group that enables us to learn about the roles of potential attributes, other than the helper’s gender, that may affect the norm compliance price point.
Design details
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