Norm elicitations in dictator games and the prisoners' dilemma

How to cite

Semb, Joakim. 2022. "Norm elicitations in dictator games and the prisoners' dilemma." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009195. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9195-1.1

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Joakim Semb*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009195
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9195-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-04-08 – 2022-10-01
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9195

Abstract

This preregistration presents the planned analyses for an experiment in which norms are elicited for two variations each of two commonly studied games: dictator games and the prisoners' dilemma (PD). The experiment addresses open questions in each game. See attached document for details.

Experimental design

Krupka-Weber norm elicitations in two games: the prisoner's dilemma and binary dictator games. Dictator games varied along the role dimension: role certainty versus role uncertainty. PD varied along strategic certainty: either simultaneous-move, or second-mover facing cooperation. See attached document for details.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
1000
Observations
1000
Arms
500 players; 500 observers. 500 simultaneous-move PD; 500 sequential. 500 role certainty; 500 role uncertainty. Independent randomization across these dimensions.
Primary outcomes
Social appropriateness of cooperation (PD) and giving (dictator games) across treatment conditions: simultaneous vs. sequential PD facing cooperation; role-certain vs. role-uncertain dictator games; player vs. observer.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords