Redistribution and effort

How to cite

Seres, Gyula; Lim, Noah. 2022. "Redistribution and effort." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009158. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9158-1.2

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Gyula Seres* , Noah Lim

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009158
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9158-1.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2022-03-31 – 2023-12-31
Countries
Singapore ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9158

Abstract

This study tests whether the effects of redistribution on effort depend on how redistribution is framed. There are redistribution schemes that provide identical incentives in the sense that they result in the same disposable or net income for an agent with any given gross income. Yet, the idea has been proposed that framing affects incentives. In particular, universal basic income (UBI) is theorized to result in lower labor supply as the transfer is presented as unconditional in comparison to an equivalent negative income tax (NIT). Using a between-subject design, this RCT tests this hypothesis using a repeated real-effort experiment in which subjects receive payment for their performance, pay taxes and receive transfers. The two treatments result in the same net income for any distribution of gross income levels.

Intervention

This is a laboratory experiment employing a between-subject design. In each session with ten participants, subjects are randomly allocated into two groups of five using the experimental software zTree. This matching remains fixed throughout the experiment. They play a real-effort game five times. In each game, they have 4 minutes to complete tasks and those with higher performance receive higher rewards. The real-effort task is to type a randomly generated block of 20 characters backward into a text box. The blocks of characters were randomly drawn with replacement from a pool of 500 pre-generated blocks. After submitting the text, participants receive feedback and a new block of characters. They may complete as many tasks as they wished. At the end of the period, participants learned the number of correctly typed blocks. Each completed task is rewarded with 0.30 SGD gross payment.

In the control group (BM), there is no tax and no transfer. Participants always receive the full flat-rate payment for each completed task. The repeated game is played in two conditions that are identical in the distribution of final payoffs but different in how redistribution is framed. In the negative income tax (NIT) treatment, all tax is born by subjects that earn above the mean income. In particular, the tax is equivalent to 30% or 50% (depending on the treatment) of the difference between the gross income of the subject and the average gross income. Those below average receive a negative tax: they don't pay tax, only receive it. The transfer is equal to 30% or 50% (depending on the treatment) of the difference between their income and the average. By design, the sum of taxes equals the sum of transfers.

In the universal basic income (UBI) treatment, all subjects pay 30% or 50% (depending on the treatment) of their gross income as tax. Then, they receive an unconditional payment after each round that is an equal share of all tax revenues. The list of net incomes is identical to that of the NIT treatment for any gross income levels in the group.

Experimental design

This part is identical to the "Intervention (Public)" section above.

Design details

Randomization method
The study follow a between-subject design. Each session is run with 10 or 15 subjects in groups of five. Subjects self-enroll into sessions.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomization is the experimental session.
Clusters
30 sessions.
Observations
305 subjects, 1525 observations.
Arms
75 subjects in UBI 50% tax 75 subjects in NIT 50% tax 55 subjects in BM 50 subjects in NIT 30% tax 50 subjects in UBI 30% tax
Primary outcomes
The number of finished tasks in a period by a subject (score).

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords