Experimental Auctions with Securities

How to cite

Breig, Zachary. 2022. "Experimental Auctions with Securities." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009157. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9157-2.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Zachary Breig*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009157
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9157-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2022-03-29 – 2022-04-22
Countries
Australia ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9157

Abstract

We evaluate auctions with securities using laboratory experiments. We compare first-price auctions using debt, first-price auctions using equities, second-price auctions using debt, second-price auctions using equities, and informal auctions.

Intervention

We compare first-price auctions using debt, first-price auctions using equities, second-price auctions using debt, second-price auctions using equities, and informal auctions. Each subject participates in a single type of auction.

Experimental design

We carry out 5 experimental treatments

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by computer.
Randomization unit
Subjects are randomly matched into pairs and randomly given values by the computer.
Clusters
12-16 sessions for a total of 35-40 subjects per treatment
Observations
350-400 auctions per treatment.
Arms
As documented in the pre-analysis plan, we aim to have 35-40 participants per treatment completing 20 auctions each, which (accounting for two participants per auction) gives a total of 350-400 auctions per treatment.
Primary outcomes
Our primary outcome variables of interest are the revenue and efficiency characteristics of all types of auctions. The precise definitions of these variables are given in the pre-analysis plan.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords