Auditing Business Safety Inspectors
How to cite
Barron, Manuel; Goicoechea, Ana; Bedoya, Guadalupe; Gertler, Paul; Montufar, Diego Garcia. 2022. "Auditing Business Safety Inspectors." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009125. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9125-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In collaboration with the Ministry of Housing and up to five municipalities in Peru, we will conduct an experiment to evaluate whether variations in the implementation of the building safety-regulation can improve state's capacity and safety and reduce leakages. Most firms require multiple visits to obtain the safety certificate and start operations, creating inefficiencies and opportunities for rent-seeking. Constraints identified in this system include high discretion in the application of the regulation and low capacity to enforce the regulation by municipalities in charge of the implementation. We are rolling out an electronic inspection system and will assess the impact of increasing inspector accountability through random audits.
Intervention
Business safety inspections in Peru are conducted by municipal inspectors who have little or no oversight. Together with a vague regulation, this creates room for rent-seeking and gives inspectors little incentives to exert effort. In collaboration with up to three municipalities in Lima, we are setting up an auditing system where a highly trained third-party auditor visits recently inspected firms and double-checks a random subset of inspection items. One treatment arm has a high audit rate (~70%) and the other a low audit rate (~20%).
Experimental design
Inspectors are randomly assigned to High or Low audit intensity arms, which will determine if 70 or 20% of their inspections will be audited. The trial will run for 6 months.
Design details
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