Can combining tax and subsidy generate less public opposition than tax alone?
How to cite
Andreassen, Gøril; Kallbekken, Steffen; Rosendahl, Knut Einar.
2022. "Can combining tax and subsidy generate less public opposition than tax alone?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009099.
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9099-2.0
Download:
BibTeX
·
RIS— for reference managers without a browser
translator. Zotero and most
others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
Gøril Andreassen*
, Steffen Kallbekken
, Knut Einar Rosendahl
Pigouvian taxes are politically difficult to introduce at a high enough rate because of opposition from the public. Subsidies on the other hand are often popular. How will a combination of tax and subsidies be considered by ordinary people, compared to each of the policy instruments in isolation? Will a combination of a tax and a subsidy generate less public opposition than tax alone? Is there a difference in the support if the combination is more tax than subsidies or if there is more subsidies than tax? We investigate this in an online interactive experiment.
Intervention
The intervention is to study the support for policy with different combinations of tax and subsidy compared to only tax and only subsidy. The voting over policy is done for a fictitious market with externalities.
Experimental design
This is a lab experiment with a between-subjects design. The participants are recruited from the online platform Prolific.
Design details
Randomization method
We randomize participants into the five different treatment groups according to the order in which they enter into the experiment and answer correctly on the control questions because the order people enter the experiment and answer control questions is random. We use this code to order the participants into the five different treatments: treatment = 1 + (groupNr-1) \% 5
Randomization unit
Groups of three Prolific participants.
Clusters
500 groups.
Observations
1500 participants.
Arms
1. 100 groups with in total 300 participants: Tax
2. 100 groups with in total 300 participants: Subsidy
3. 100 groups with in total 300 participants: A combination of tax (25%) and subsidy (75%)
4. 100 groups with in total 300 participants: A combination of tax (50%) and subsidy (50%)
5. 100 groups with in total 300 participants: A combination of tax (75%) and subsidy (25%)
Primary outcomes
The key outcome variable is the binary variable on whether the participants voted for a policy or not. There are five options: a tax, a subsidy or three different combinations of those two. We will compare the support for the different combinations with the tax and with the subsidy.
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.