Willful Ignorance and Reflection

How to cite

Bopp, Fabian; Schnedler, Wendelin. 2022. "Willful Ignorance and Reflection." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009092. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9092-1.0

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Fabian Bopp* , Wendelin Schnedler

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009092
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9092-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-03-31 – 2022-05-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9092

Abstract

Many people claim to intend to act pro-socially but do not. One reason might be that they are willfully ignoring the harm that they impose on others; this may allow them to maintain a positive self-image while serving their own interests. If this is the case, careful reflection may reveal to subjects that they are "kidding" themselves. We examine experimentally, whether reflection results in more people informing themselves about the negative consequences of their choices.

Intervention

Subjects are asked to explain their aims and how they intend to achieve them before the experiment. The difference between treatments is about which part of the experiment subjects are a supposed to explain. This can be either the first part, which is about revealing the consequences of a decision on others (OTHER treatment), or the second part, which is about revealing one's own chances to win (OWN treatment).

Experimental design

The first part is based on the hidden information treatment in the moral wiggle room game by Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007). Subject A can choose between two Options 'high' and 'low'. Her payoff is directly connected to her choice and is known to subject A. The payoff of subject B is depending on the choice of A. At the beginning of the game either interests are conflicting or aligned. If the interests are aligned the 'high' option is best for both subjects. If the interests are conflicting, the 'low' option is better for subject B and worse for A. In this case, subject A would be in a social dilemma. Subject A can decide whether he wants to learn whether the interests are aligned or conflicting. (This is the primary outcome variable.) In order to maximize observations, we use the strategy method for the information decision.

The second part is a lottery choice. The subject can choose between betting on blue or green. The subject can also forego some of its winning prize to reveal which color is more likely to win.

We ask subjects for one of the two parts to explain their aims and what they plan to do before actually making their respective choices. The intervention is then for which part they are asked this explanation. For the respective part, the explanation presumably increases reflection.

The experiment is run using subjects from Amazon Turk. In a previous lab experiment, we observed that most women reveal the consequences even without reflection. This is why we restrict the sample to men who tended to ignore the consequences of their decision and may hence be more susceptible to the intervention.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization is done by a computer
Randomization unit
Individuals are randomly assigned into treatments within one session
Clusters
0
Observations
600
Arms
300 men explaining decision about revealing information on payoff of other player (OTHER treatment) 300 men explaining decision when revealing information on own expected payoff (OWN treatment)
Primary outcomes
share of how many subjects inform themselves (reveal the consequences of their decision)
Secondary outcomes
share of pro-social choices

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords