Competetive Rating Systems in Healthcare Credence Goods Markets

How to cite

Rittmannsberger, Thomas; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Angerer, Silvia; Waibel, Christian; Mimra, Wanda. 2022. "Competetive Rating Systems in Healthcare Credence Goods Markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009086. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9086-1.0

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Thomas Rittmannsberger* , Daniela Glätzle-Rützler , Silvia Angerer , Christian Waibel , Wanda Mimra

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009086
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9086-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-03-14 – 2022-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9086

Abstract

A key characteristic of health care markets is the information asymmetry between patients and physicians. Physicians know more about the disease and the appropriate treatment than patients. This may result in different forms of physician misbehavior: providing more treatments than necessary, i.e. overtreatment; providing less treatment than necessary, i.e. undertreatment or charging more treatments than provided, i.e. overcharging. Patients have to trust in physicians that they receive appropriate treatment. This is why health services are often referred to as credence goods (Darby and Karni 1973, Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006).
The provision of feedback on rating platforms and the associated reputation building has gained more and more attention in the past two decades in the context of physician-patient interactions. In Germany, for instance, about 70% of physician-rating website users are influenced by the rating in their physician choice (Emmert and Meszmer 2018).
Based on the credence goods framework established by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) and Dulleck et al. (2011), we introduce a toy model that enables us to derive hypotheses and test them in a laboratory experiment. In total, three conditions of market interactions are planned with 144 undergraduate students either in the role of physicians or patients. In the baseline condition (B), no reputation building is possible between physicians and patients. In two rating conditions, we introduce the possibility to rate physicians on a rating scale between zero and five stars. The rating is based on the payoff information of patients resulting from the interaction between physician and patient. In the first rating condition (R-noComp), physicians observe their own public rating when they make their decisions, but not that of other physicians. In the second rating condition (R-Comp), physicians see their own public rating, as well as the public rating of other physicans.
Our design allows us to investigate the effect of a public rating mechanism on outcomes in healthcare credence goods markets. Furthermore, it enables us to explore whether strategic considerations regarding the relative ranking in the rating system influence physician behaviour.

References
Darby, M. R. and E. Karni (1973). "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud." Journal of Law & Economics 16(1): 67-88.
Dulleck, U. and R. Kerschbamer (2006). "On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods." Journal of Economic Literature 44(1): 5-42. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/002205106776162717.
Dulleck, U., R. Kerschbamer and M. Sutter (2011). "The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition." American Economic Review 101(2): 526-555. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.526.
Emmert, M. and N. Meszmer (2018). "Eine Dekade Arztbewertungsportale in Deutschland: Eine Zwischenbilanz Zum Aktuellen Entwicklungsstand." Gesundheitswesen 80(10): 851-858. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1055/s-0043-114002.

Intervention

We experimentally investigate the effect of a public rating system in healthcare credence goods markets. Therefore, we plan to employ a laboratory experiment framed in a healthcare context, where experts are called physicians and consumers are called patients, using a student sample from the University of Innsbruck.
To start with, we plan to run three experimental conditions. In the baseline condition, there is no feedback mechanism in place. Next, we introduce a public rating mechanism into the market, where patients can rate the interactions with physicians on a five-star-rating-scale. To explore whether strategic considerations influence physician behaviour, we employ one condition, where physicians only see their own public rating, but not that of other pyhsicians, and a second condition where they see both, their own, and the public rating of others.
Our design allows us to investigate the effect of a public rating mechanism on outcomes in healthcare credence goods markets. Furthermore, it enables us to explore whether strategic considerations regarding the relative rank in the rating system influence physician behaviour.

Experimental design

We plan to use a student sample from the University of Innsbruck and run each experimental condition with 48 subjects (as suggested by our power analysis). Therefore, we plan to run two sessions with 24 subjects each in every experimental condition. All sessions are run computerized using z-Tree and students are recruited using hroot. Participants do not know which experiment they are going to participate in when they register. They only receive information about the expected duration of the experiment (2h).
Our experiment is structured as follows for all our conditions:

Stage 1: The experimenter explains the experiment and participants read the instructions.
Stage 2: Participants answer several control questions to ensure they understood the game.
Stage 3: The computer randomly assigns roles and markets to participants.
Stage 4: Participants play the game for 16 periods.
Stage 5: Participants answer several questions concerning their strategy in the game and beliefs about others.
Stage 6: Participants participate in additional games: an individual risk preference task, a dictator game, a lying task, and a trust game.
Stage 7: Participants fill out a questionnaire.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is carried out in the experiment by a computer.
Randomization unit
at the session level
Clusters
6 clusters á 8 individuals per experimental condition.
Observations
48 (6 x 8) individuals per experimental condition.
Arms
144 (3 x 48) individuals (students at the University of Innsbruck).
Primary outcomes
Overtreatment-Rates
Secondary outcomes
Market Efficiency.

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Keywords