Trust in hiring algorithms: causal effect of beliefs about humans’ discrimination for workers, and self-confidence for managers

How to cite

Dargnies, Marie-Pierre; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea. 2022. "Trust in hiring algorithms: causal effect of beliefs about humans’ discrimination for workers, and self-confidence for managers." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009068. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9068-3.0

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Marie-Pierre Dargnies* , Rustamdjan Hakimov , Dorothea Kübler

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009068
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9068-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-03-21 – 2022-06-15
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9068

Abstract

We run an online experiment to study ways to overcome algorithm aversion. We use a 2*2 design. Participants are either in the role of workers or of managers. They will furthermore either be assigned to the baseline or the treatment. Workers perform three real-effort tasks: task 1, task 2 and the job task. They must choose whether they prefer hiring decisions between themsef and another worker to be made by a participant in the role of a manager or an algorithm. They will get paid if they are hired in one random pair of workers they belong to. They know that the manager will get paid if they hire the best worker at the job task out of a random pair of workers they have made a hiring decision for. The managers and the algorithm will base their hiring decision on the genders of the workers and their task 1 and task 2 perfromances. In the workers' treatment, before deciding between the manager and the algorithm, workers are informed of the proportion of men and women who were chosen to be hired by the managers in a managers' session. Managers must make 20 hiring decisions between pairs of workers. They can see the gender of the workers and their task 1 and task 2 performances. We elicit for how many of the 20 decisions they believe they have hired the best worker of the pair. They must then decide whether they want to delegate the hiring decisions to the algorithm. If they do, their payoff will depend on the algorithm's hiring decision, not theirs. In the managers' treatment, managers will get a feedback about their over/under or well-calibrated confidence before the decision whether to delegate the hiring decisions to the algorithm

Experimental design

We run an online experiment to study ways to overcome algorithm aversion. Participants are either in the role of workers or of managers. Workers will either be assigned to the baseline, treatment 1, treatment 2 or treatment 3. Managers will either be assigned to the baseline, treatment 1 or treatment 2. Workers perform three real-effort tasks: task 1, task 2 and the job task. They must choose whether they prefer hiring decisions between themself and another worker to be made by a participant in the role of a manager or an algorithm. They will get paid if they are hired in one random pair of workers they belong to. They know that the manager will get paid if they hire the best worker at the job task out of a random pair of workers they have made a hiring decision for. In the workers baseline and treatments 1 and 3, the managers and the algorithm will base their hiring decision on the genders of the workers and their task 1 and task 2 performances. In the workers' treatment 1, before deciding between the manager and the algorithm, workers are informed of the proportion of men and women who were chosen to be hired by the managers in a managers' session. In the workers' treatment 2, the algorithm will base its hiring decisions on the task 1 and task 2 performances of the workers but not on their gender. In the workers' treatment 3, details will be given about how the algorithm works to decide which workers to hire. Managers must always make 20 hiring decisions between pairs of workers. They can see the gender of the workers and their task 1 and task 2 performances. We elicit for how many of the 20 decisions they believe they have hired the best worker of the pair. They must then decide whether they want to delegate the hiring decisions to the algorithm. If they do, their payoff will depend on the algorithm's hiring decision, not theirs. In the managers' treatment 1, managers will get a feedback about their over/under or well-calibrated confidence before the decision whether to delegate the hiring decisions to the algorithm. In the managers' treatment 2, details are given about how the algorithm works before managers have to decide whether to delegate the hiring decisions to the algorithm.

Design details

Randomization method
The participants will select into one of the treatments (Baseline workers, Treatment 1 workers, Treatment 2 workers, Treatment 3 workers, Baseline managers, Treatment 1 managers, Treatment 2 managers) randomly.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
1750 individuals
Observations
1750 individuals
Arms
250 in each of the treatments : Baseline workers, Treatment 1 workers, Treatment 2 workers, Treatment 3 workers, Baseline managers, Treatment 1 managers, Treatment 2 managers.
Primary outcomes
For both workers and managers, we are interested in whether the treatments decrease algorithm aversion. For workers, a decreased algorithm aversion would mean a higher proportion of workers would choose that the hiring decisions are made by the algorithm in the workers' treatments than in the workers' baseline. For managers, a decreased algorithm aversion would mean a higher proportion of managers would choose to delegate the hiring decisions to the algorithm in the managers' treatment than in the managers' baseline.
Secondary outcomes
We are interested in finding additional evidence of algorithm aversion and investigating whether it depends on the confidence of workers in their relative performance and the confidence of managers in the quality of their hiring decisions. We are also interested in potentially different effects of the treatment depending on the gender of the participant, their belief about the discriminative behavior of the algorithm compared to that of the manager and , the confidence of workers in their relative performance, and the confidence of managers in the quality of their hiring decisions. Finally, we are interested in whether workers' beliefs about how discriminatory the algorithm is changes with the treatments.

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Keywords